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ABSTRACT 
 
The European Union (EU) introduced the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) in the Lisbon Treaty as a 
means of strengthening citizen involvement in the European decision-making process. The ECI allows a 
minimum of one million EU citizens to request that the European Commission submit a legislative 
proposal on the issue of the initiative. The ECI is, however, not only a means of strengthening 
participatory democracy in the EU. It also bears the potential to democratise the EU by facilitating the 
emergence of a general European public sphere since it essentially encourages European citizens to 
debate issues of European relevance across national borders. This is relevant because it is often claimed 
that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit. 
  
The aim of this paper is to assess the potential of the ECI as a solution to the democratic deficit in the EU. 
For this purpose, both the normative concepts of the democratic public sphere and citizenship based on 
secondary literature and the empirical concept of European citizenship based on an analysis of the “sites” 
of European citizenship, i.e., EU Treaties, the Acquis communautaire and European citizenship practices, 
will be examined. According to normative theories, citizenship is both a constitutive element and a 
prerequisite for a democratic public sphere. Citizenship is composed of rights and duties, participation 
and identity. The paper proposes a normative theoretical model of democracy as a point of reference for 
the assessment of European citizenship as well as for the discussion of the ECI as a solution to the 
democratic deficit. 
  
Previous research evaluates the ECI based on its practical implications or its contribution to participatory 
democracy. Instead, this paper contextualises the ECI as part of the empirical concept of European 
citizenship. This is based on the assumption that the democratic deficit is actually a citizenship deficit. 
  
The assessment of European citizenship conducted in this paper finds that the ECI only has limited 
potential as a catalyst for the emergence of a European public sphere since European citizenship deviates 
significantly from normative standards. Furthermore, a democratisation of the EU will inevitably bring 
about the end of European nation-states. As a result, European citizens face a democratic dilemma.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: European citizenship, European Citizens’ Initiative, public sphere, 
democratic deficit 
5 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last fifty years, the European nation-states have transferred much of their 
powers to the institutions of the European Union (EU) and to mechanisms of 
intergovernmental decision-making (Brüggemann 2005: 58). What started as a 
functional project of economic cooperation between nation-states has also become an 
exercise in polity-building as the EU has engaged increasingly in more policy fields 
(Smismans 2009: 59). European integration is no doubt an effort to remedy the 
particular contemporary challenges associated with globalisation (Eriksen & Fossum 
2000: 1). However, as the EU has grown, the concern with democracy has been a 
question posed not only about the Member States but also about the workings of the EU 
itself (Brüggemann 2005: 58); it is now widely held that the EU suffers from a 
democratic deficit (Eriksen & Fossum 2000: 2). By the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, the EU, therefore, represents “both the greatest hope and the greatest danger 
to democracy in Europe” (Katz 2001: 54).  
 
On the one hand, the EU has acted as an important consolidator of democracy in post-
authoritarian and post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe that have 
acceded to the Union (Fossum &Schlesinger 2007: 2). On the other hand, it lacks 
democratic legitimacy (Brüggemann 2005: 58), which is often attributed to its weak 
popular legitimacy (Eriksen & Fossum 2000: 2). An increasing number of measures 
decided at the European level affect more and more citizens over a greater number of 
areas of life. Given that the role of the citizen has mainly been institutionalised at the 
national level, European citizens have hitherto had no effective means of debating 
European issues and influencing the decision-making processes in the EU (Habermas 
1994: 30). The continuous transfer of power to European institutions, therefore, 
produces a new and worrying form of democratic deficit in Europe, and, as a result, 
both the justification of the European project and its viability are at stake (Giorgi, 
Crowley & Ney 2001: 73).  
 
It cannot be taken for granted that the EU is a ‘good thing’ independently of its 
institutional dynamics (Giorgi et al. 2001: 73) and there is now a strong onus on the EU 
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to comply with democratic norms. It has, therefore, become increasingly relevant to 
discuss whether there could be a European public sphere in which European citizens 
could address common issues across state borders simultaneously and see themselves as 
the authors of the EU laws they abide by. (Fossum and Schlesinger 2007: 2.) Only with 
a European-wide public sphere in place can the requirements of democracy beyond the 
nation-state be met (Giorgi et al. 2001: 74). This is so because the public sphere has 
profound implications for the conception of democratic legitimacy. It compels decision 
makers to enter the public arena in order to justify their decisions and to gain support. 
(Eriksen 2007: 25.) Publicity is, therefore, supposed to discredit views that cannot 
withstand critical scrutiny and to assure the legitimacy of those that do. As a result, the 
public sphere is supposed to ensure that the actions of the governing bodies express the 
will of the citizenry. (Fraser 2007: 7.) 
 
In order to address persistent concerns about a democratic deficit in the EU, the 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 as a 
means of strengthening citizen participation in the EU’s legislative process (Conrad 
2011: 5). Since 1 April 2012, citizens of the European Union have been able to submit a 
proposal for European legislation to the European Commission within the framework of 
the legislative powers attributed to the EU (Glogowski & Maurer 2013: 7). Through its 
implicit appeal to a broader political space beyond national borders, the ECI essentially 
encourages European citizens to act on commonalities that transcend their national 
identities and to initiate legislative change from below (Kostakopoulou 2013: 13). The 
ECI is, therefore, not just an intriguing innovation in relation to increased citizen 
participation (Conrad 2011: 5). It also has the potential to facilitate the emergence of a 
common political space in Europe (Kostakopoulou 2013: 13). 
 
Previous research on the ECI has focused on practical chances, constraints and 
limitations when evaluating its impact on democracy in the EU (Stratulat & 
Emmanouilidis 2010; Glogowski & Maurer 2013) Furthermore, research that examines 
the ECI from the perspective of democratic theory often limits the focus to participatory 
democracy (Conrad 2011). However, these studies are limited by their polity-activating 
conception of European democracy. According to Saward (2013: 225−226), polity-
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activating conceptions are built upon the assumption that the core structures and 
procedures of the EU, with its borders and major political rules and institutions are in 
place and functional. The purpose of the ECI under such a conception is to activate the 
polity – make it work better, enliven it, reform specific features in order to help it to be 
what it can or ought to be (ibid.). Instead, this paper is suggesting that it is necessary to 
contextualise the ECI as part of European citizenship. By examining the empirical 
concept of European citizenship, this research avoids a polity-activating approach since 
it does not assume that a single instrument is sufficient to democratise the EU. 
 
Citizenship implies membership of a political community and it is defined by rights and 
duties, participation and identity (Delanty 1997). It has been argued that European 
citizenship has been based mainly on the liberal conception of citizenship, i.e., 
conceiving it as a formal, legal right-bearing status (Smismans 2009: 60) Following the 
reasoning by Kiernan (1997), this paper, therefore, suggests that the democratic deficit 
in the European Union is a citizenship deficit. Since the public sphere, as a collective 
concept, not only involves participation in a sphere of communication but also a 
collective idea of belonging to a public discussing common themes and problems 
(Peters 1999: 185) as well as rights that secure the public sphere as a common space for 
communication (Fossum & Schelsinger 2007: 5), it is plausible to assume that a 
functioning public sphere presupposes citizenship. The emergence of a European public 
sphere, therefore, presupposes European citizens equipped with EU rights, opportunities 
to participate in European decision-making processes and a European collective 
identity. In this sense, it is necessary to examine the ECI in terms of its contribution to 
European citizenship. The question is, thus, whether the ECI has the potential to be a 
solution to the democratic deficit in the EU by contributing to a more adequate model of 
European citizenship, thereby, facilitating the emergence of a European public sphere?  
 
 
1.1. Methodological nationalism 
 
In order to address the problem of the democratic deficit in the European Union, it is 
necessary to question the widely held conception of democracy and democratic 
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legitimacy as intimately linked with and as dependent on the nation-state (Eriksen & 
Fossum 2000: 7). Ulrich Beck (2003: 544ff.) notes that assessments of the democratic 
deficit in the EU are easily distorted by what he calls the hegemonic role of 
methodological nationalism (Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 11). Methodological 
nationalism equates societies with national societies and conceives them as territorially 
delimited units (Beck & Grande 2007: 18) that has a right to self-determination within 
the frame of their own cultural distinctiveness (Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 11): 
 
“Methodological nationalism assumes this normative claim as a socio-ontological 
given and simultaneously links it to the most important conflict and organisation 
orientation of society and politics. These basic tenets have become the main 
perceptual grid of social science. Indeed, the social-scientific stance is rooted in 
the concept of nation state. A nation state outlook on society and politics, law and 
justice and history governs the sociological imagination. To some extent, much of 
social science is a prisoner of the nation state.” (Beck 2003: 454.) 
 
This also manifests itself in a certain propensity to associate polity-formation with state-
formation. Although the nation-state has become the dominant organisational form at 
present, there is, however, no a priori assurance that this trend will continue and, in 
recent years, some analysts have made efforts to think through which alternative 
standards can be applied. (Eriksen & Fossum 2000: 8.) The EU, therefore, seems to face 
a democratic dilemma: if it is to be a more standard democracy, it must become more 
recognisable like the modern state or federation; or, if it is to be a novel form of 
democracy (Bohman 2004: 318), then it must also give up the concepts and normative 
principles associated with the nation-state (Linklater 1996: 78). 
 
According to Follesdal (2001: 324), the conclusion is not automatically that the 
normative political ideals and standards of democratic governance associated with the 
nation-state should be scrapped as Beck (2003) seems to suggest; this “would run 
counter to the traditional critical function of normative political theory in the Western 
tradition” (Follesdal 2001: 324). Furthermore, traditional theorising about citizenship, 
which proceeded from liberal, republican and communitarian perspectives (Bellucci, 
Sanders, Tóka & Torcal 2012: 5−6) has established normative standards for citizenship 
that ought not to be carelessly abandoned in the building of transnational institutions 
(Greven 2000: 36). The discrepancies between EU institutions and normative political 
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theory are, therefore, not necessarily a weakness of theory; they may equally well be 
weaknesses of the institutions. As a result, an equally sound conclusion is that the 
concept of European citizenship bolsters demands for institutional redesign. (Follesdal 
2001: 324.)  
 
When assessing the democratic deficit in the EU, it is at the same time necessary to 
keep in mind that nation-states often actually fail to adhere properly to the democratic 
standards associated with the nation-state model itself (Eriksen & Fossum 2000: 8). 
Portrayals of the nation-state are, in fact, “often bedevilled by the image of an ideal-
typical ‘state’ whose authority is unquestioned and whose institutions work smoothly” 
(Keohane & Hoffmann 1990: 279) although no such state has ever existed. Instead, 
when viewed close-up, all modern states appear “riddled with inefficiencies and 
contradictions” (ibid.). Nonetheless, this has not led to the abandonment of normative 
theories of legitimacy when assessing the democratic credentials of nation-states. It, 
therefore, seems equally reasonable to apply democratic normative ideals of political 
theory to the European Union when assessing European citizenship as a solution to its 
democratic deficit.  
 
 
1.2. Methodology and structure of the study 
 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the European Citizens’ Initiative as a solution to the 
democratic deficit. In order for the ECI to be a catalyst for a democratisation of the EU, 
it is necessary that the ECI facilitates the emergence of a European public sphere. From 
the perspective of normative theories of the democratic public sphere, citizenship is 
both a constitutive element and a prerequisite. In this paper, citizenship is composed of 
rights and duties, participation and identity.  Since the ECI is expected to mainly 
contribute to the participatory dimension of citizenship, the ECI does not have the 
potential to create a common European public space if the other components of 
citizenship are not in place. As a result, this paper proposes that the ECI must be 
contextualised as part of the concept of European citizenship. The purpose of this 
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research is, therefore, to assess the ECI in terms of its contribution to European 
citizenship. The primary research problem is based on the following hypothesis: 
 
An adequate model of European citizenship ought to be composed of the formal 
dimension of rights and duties, on the one side, and, on the other side, the 
substantive dimensions of participation and identity if the European Citizens’ 
Initiative is to be a solution to the democratic deficit in the European Union by 
contributing to the emergence of a European public sphere.  
 
Research on the European public sphere frequently aims to identify and analyse a 
possible emerging European public space with regard to its democratic functions in 
relation to powerful institutions at the European level (Haug 2008: 2). In the realisation 
of this goal, studies on the European public sphere have often adopted a top-down 
perspective focusing on institutional change (Brüggeman 2005). However, this paper 
argues that since an emerging public sphere is dependent on the construction of a 
European citizenship, research on the European public sphere cannot be treated as an 
entirely elite-driven, top-down process (Bellamy et al. 2006: 1). Political strugglers over 
citizenship rights have often contributed to the formation of new political communities 
(Wiener 2003: 402) and, given the absence of clear institutional channels and the 
difficulty in creating them (Bohman 2007: 2), bottom-up mobilisation is another 
important factor in the emergence of a European public sphere (Wiener 2003: 402). 
  
When studying citizenship, top-down and bottom-up approaches are usually kept 
separate and studies independently of one another. According to Moro (2012: 9), it is, 
however, critical to overcome such a distinction. In this, paper, they will therefore be 
considered as inextricably connected by invoking a methodological perspective 
suggested by Bellamy et al. (2006) that sees: 
  
“[…] citizenship as a dynamic and contested process emanating as much from 
below as from above […] European citizens are not only being ‘made’ and 
‘transformed’ by European institutions and contemporary social and economic 
conditions but also (and more importantly) ‘making’ and ‘transforming’ both 
themselves and the European political space.” (Bellamy et al. 2006: 1) 
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In order to analyse and evaluate the ECI in a meaningful way, both the normative 
concepts of the democratic public sphere and citizenship based on secondary literature 
and the empirical concept of European citizenship based on an analysis of the “sites” of 
European citizenship will be introduced as points of reference for the discussion of 
European citizenship as a solution to the democratic deficit. The theoretical framework 
is based on an extensive theoretical examination and review of normative theories, 
which creates the basic ground for the empirical research. Theories of citizenship fall 
into two categories: normative theories and empirical theories (Bellamy 2008a: 27). 
Since normative theories attempt to set out what citizenship ideally ought to be, it is 
more suitable for this particular research to focus on normative theories. The analysis of 
European citizenship carried out in this paper avoids reducing the “sites” of European 
citizenship to the EU Treaties, namely its primary law (Moro 2012: 39). This is 
necessary because European citizenship also resides in the Acquis communautaire as 
well as in the practices of citizenship (Warleigh 2001: 21−22). The empirical data, 
therefore, consists of EU Treaties; secondary legislation, namely the case law of the 
European Court of Justice; declarations and resolutions adopted by the Commission; 
Eurobarometer Surveys; and secondary literature. Since the European Union is a unique 
political entity in that it is at least not yet a nation-state (Maynor 2008: 188), European 
citizenship is expected to be different from the normative theoretical concept of 
citizenship presented in this paper. 
 
At the outset of this study, the normative theoretical concepts of the democratic public 
sphere and citizenship are outlined in order to develop a normative point of reference 
that will guide the further analysis. The paper starts with theorising the democratic 
public sphere in order to illustrate the importance of citizenship for the proper 
functioning of a democratic public sphere. The paper then presents a definition of 
citizenship and sets out the core values that underpin liberal, republican and 
communitarian notions of citizenship. Citizenship can be seen in terms of three 
contrasting models which emphasise different dimensions of what membership of a 
political community entails, namely rights and duties, participation and identity 
(Smismans 2009: 60). Each of these models corresponds closely to the respective 
theoretical and ideological traditions of liberalism, republicanism and 
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communitarianism (Delanty 1997: 288). While these models are considered as 
contenders by the usual normative philosophy underlying discussions on citizenship 
(Moro 2012: 38), a different approach is presented in this paper. Following a suggestion 
given by Bellamy (2004), citizenship will be considered in terms of a triadic model in 
which citizenship is constituted of the three components of right, participation and 
identity. Based on the normative theories elaborated on in this paper, this research 
proposes a normative theoretical model of democracy that captures the relationship 
between citizenship, the public sphere and political institutions. 
 
With the normative definition of citizenship in mind, the analysis of European 
citizenship, which will be carried out in this paper will be based on these three 
components: rights, participation and identity. Before studying the empirical concept of 
European citizenship, the paper will first examine the idea of the democratic deficit – 
arguments for and against the democratic deficit will be presented – in order to 
highlight the reasons for the introduction of the European Citizens’ Initiative and to 
stress the necessity for a democratisation of the EU. The paper then introduces the ECI 
as a solution to the democratic deficit; it explains what it is, the most basic formal 
requirements and why it is expected to contribute to European democracy. Finally, the 
paper examines European citizenship in terms of European citizen rights, opportunities 
for participation in European decision-making processes and a European collective 
identity. The normative theoretical framework and the analysis of the empirical concept 
of European citizenship forms the basis for the final discussion about whether the 
introduction of the ECI means that it can plausibly be assumed that European 
citizenship could provide a normative solution to the democratic deficit. 
 
The scope of this research has posed certain delimitations to the assessment of European 
citizenship as a solution to the democratic deficit in the European Union. Firstly, there 
are theoretical limitations since the paper addresses liberal, republican and 
communitarian theories of citizenship from a general perspective. In fact, there exists a 
variety of strands within liberalism, republicanism and communitarianism. Secondly, 
the paper assesses European citizenship in terms of its potential to facilitate the 
emergence of a general European public sphere. Although citizenship is the cornerstone 
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in a democratic polity and a prerequisite of the public sphere, decision-making in the 
politico-administrative complex is also a constitutive element of the public sphere 
(Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 6). A viable public sphere, therefore, places demands on 
political institutions in terms of publicity, transparency and accountability. Although 
some issues related to the workings of European institutions will be briefly presented in 
the section about the democratic deficit, it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss 
their implications for the democratisation of the EU.  In other words, the paper does not 
address the institutional conditions necessary for the development of a European public 
sphere. Since the paper only focuses on citizenship as an important prerequisite for the 
development of a general European public sphere, the assessment of European 
citizenship as a solution to the democratic deficit is clearly limited since a polity cannot 
be deemed democratic if its institutions are undemocratic from a normative perspective. 
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2. THEORIES OF CITIZENSHIP 
 
Theories of citizenship fall into two categories: normative theories that attempt to set 
out the rights and duties a citizen ideally ought to have, and empirical theories that seek 
to describe and explain how citizens came to possess those rights and duties that they 
actually have. Normative theories look to history to explore the ideal of the good citizen 
and past accounts of citizenship have inevitably shaped how we think about what it is to 
be a citizen. By contrast, empirical theories of citizenship explore the social, economic, 
and political processes that have fashioned the emergence of citizenship in different 
times and places as well as the ways this status has been granted to different groups of 
people; these theories seek to understand how and why citizenship arose in given 
circumstances and took the forms it did. (Bellamy 2008a: 27−28.) The focus in this 
paper is on normative theories of citizenship in order to bring out the relevant analytical 
dimensions necessary for the examination of European citizenship. 
 
 
2.1. The democratic public sphere 
 
Democracy can be defined as “that set of institutions by which individuals are 
empowered as free and equal citizens to form and change the terms of their common life 
together, including democracy itself” (Bohman 2007: 1−2). A basic principle of 
democratic citizenship is, thus, that those affected by decisions on equal terms should be 
able to influence common affairs (Olsen 2003: 93) through participation and 
contestations in the public sphere. Through their collective associational, relational 
activities (formal or informal) in the public sphere, individual citizens mobilise and 
advance claims. In that sense, a shared public space, within which citizens interact and 
mobilise, is essential for the exercise of citizenship. (Soysal 2003: 160.) 
 
In order to be able to conceptualise the democratic public sphere, it is important to deal 
with three core issues. First, it is necessary to establish the ideal characteristics of the 
public sphere, so as to bring out the relevant analytical dimensions. Second, it is 
necessary to spell out its contribution to democracy as well as its normative value. 
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Third, it is necessary to identify some key problems that the public sphere is currently 
facing in the age of globalisation (Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 3.), and, in particular, 
the challenges posed by the emergence of transnational and supranational organisations 
such as the European Union (Peters 1999). 
 
2.1.1. Conceptualising the public sphere  
 
The public sphere can broadly be defined as an arena of communication in which those 
who govern and those who are subject to governance in a given legally constituted 
polity gather, and express their interests, concerns and expectations that interfere with 
political decision-making (Eder & Trenz 2007: 167). In the public sphere, individuals 
relate to one another not in terms of market transactions, nor in terms of power 
relations, but as politically equal citizens (Giorgi et al. 2001: 74). On the most general 
level, everything is public that is part of the common (as opposed to private) life of 
people in a community (Bärenreuter, Brüll, Mokre & Wahl-Jorgensen 2009: 3). The 
prime feature of the communicative forms constituting the public sphere, therefore, 
concerns matters of collective interest. Traditionally, this is thought to involve political 
matters, or affairs of the state. However, general public discussion is not limited to those 
practical questions needing solutions, but also, debates on general orientation, 
normative principles and values, relationships to a collective past, and collective 
aspirations for the future. (Peters 1994: 37.) 
  
Habermas is the founding father of the most influential concept of the public sphere 
(Eriksen 2007: 24) and according to him, the public sphere: 
 
“[…] can best be described as a network for communicating information and 
points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the 
streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a 
way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions. Like the 
lifeworld as a whole, so too, the public sphere is reproduced through 
communicative action, for which mastery of a natural language suffices; it is 
tailored to the general comprehensibility of everyday communicative practice.” 
(Habermas 1996: 360.) 
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The public sphere has a triadic character, with a speaker, an addressee and a listener 
(Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 3) and provides a discursive as well as an institutional 
arena in which citizens can discuss, deliberate, and evaluate issues of public relevance 
(Giorgi et al. 2001: 4). Historically speaking, the citizens immediately lay claim to this 
public sphere through confrontations with public authorities over the general rules of 
coexistence in the fundamentally privatised, but publicly relevant sphere for exchange 
of goods and societal work (Eriksen 2007: 24). The medium for this political 
confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: public reasoning 
(Habermas 1989: 27). The public sphere is not closed in principle or practice either to 
groups, to issues, or to modes of discourse: if it did acquire closure in any of these 
respects, it would cease, ultimately, to be public in the full sense of the word (Giorgi et 
al. 2001: 74). 
 
In conceptual terms, the public sphere is non-coercive, secular and rational (Eriksen 
2007: 25). Disagreements over the definition of problems, or proposed solutions, are 
conducted in terms of arguments that can lay claim to collective acceptance, resting 
upon shared, freely arrived at convictions. Objections or criticism are possible at any 
time, but so is the invalidation of criticism. An elementary precondition is that a 
common understanding of any one given contribution can be achieved based on mutual 
respect. Forms of communication, such as manipulation or threats, which seem to 
overpower rather than convince, are not admissible (Peters 1994: 38−39.), and the 
public sphere is, therefore, antithetical to coercion and dogmatic modes of conflict 
settlement (Eriksen 2007: 25). The public arrive at well-founded, critically examined, 
reasonable common insights, solutions to problems or collective aims through public 
discourse, and only by engaging in such discourse – or at least, to considered and 
tolerant disagreement on such insights, solutions and aims (Peters 1994: 39). 
 
2.1.2. The public sphere and democracy 
 
The public sphere is intimately linked with democracy. Since it is based on the tenet 
that everybody can speak without limitation, it can be considered a precondition for 
realising popular sovereignty. (Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 4−5.) Legal rights to 
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freedom of expression and assembly secure the public sphere as a common space for 
communication (Eriksen 2007: 27), where enlightened and critical citizens reach 
agreement through public discussion on the rules of communal life, on their common 
self-understanding and aims, and on current problems and possible solutions (Peters 
1993: 17). At the heart of its normative principles is the belief that the exchange of 
opinions among free and politically equal citizens is the only legitimate basis for the 
generation of laws and the exercise of political power (Greven 2000: 45). 
 
The development of a modern public sphere has profound implications for how 
democratic legitimacy may be conceived. When citizens become equipped with rights 
they can exercise against the state, decision makers also face the need to justify their 
decisions and to gain support in public. (Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 5.) This forms the 
background to speaking of a modern public sphere that is critical of power (Eriksen 
2007: 25). In such a setting, it does not suffice to show people the power of the power 
holder but this power has to be derived from the will of the people and, depending on 
the respective theoretical understanding, the public sphere is either understood as the 
place where this will shows itself or where it is developed (Bärenreuter et al. 2009: 3). 
This makes legitimacy precarious but it also becomes an important democratic resource 
(Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 5). It is neither a given set of institutions nor concrete 
persons that guarantee the legitimacy of the law. Only public debate in itself has norm-
giving power. (Eriksen 2007: 25.) 
 
From the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must not only detect and 
identify problems in society, but also convincingly and influentially thematise them, 
furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatise them in such a way that they are 
taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes (Habermas 1996: 259). The public 
sphere, thus, embodies the idea of a democratic circulation of power, that is, political 
power originates in the people through the public formation of political intentions that 
are summarised and condensed in parliamentary discussion and decisions. The 
parliamentary nexus consists of formal political institutions, such as the parliament 
together with those organs involved in parliamentary business, such as committees and 
expert commissions; plus political parties and any organisation, which seek to influence 
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elections and parliamentary decisions. (Peters 1993: 21−23.) It is connected to the 
periphery of civil society through a set of channels of political influence such as 
elections, neo-corporatist lobbying, interest aggregation, and, of course, public debate 
(Eriksen 2007: 27). 
 
For collective decisions to be regarded as legitimate, it must be demonstrated that they 
started with a communication process originating in the periphery (Habermas 1996: 
356) and were channelled into the formal power apparatus in a procedurally correct 
manner (Eriksen 2007: 27): 
 
“[…] the legitimacy of decisions depends on processes of opinion- and will-
formation at the periphery. The centre is a system of sluices through which many 
processes in the sphere of the political-legal system must pass, but the centre 
control the direction and the dynamics of these processes only to a limited degree. 
Changes can start just as much at the periphery as at the centre, and it cannot be 
assumed in every case that the institutional centre will mainly determine the 
course taken by any one change […] After all, the democratic idea is ultimately 
based upon the principle that the processes through which political opinions and 
intents are shaped […] having a peripheral or intermediate status, should decide 
the course of political development.” (Peters 1993: 25−26.) 
 
This ‘official circulation of power’ can be represented in a model that serves as heuristic 
device that enables a clearer delineation of both the constitutive elements of the public 
sphere and its presuppositions (Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 5−6). The model is 
outlined in the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The circulation of political power (Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 6). 
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The model clearly depicts that the centre controls instruments of power and decision-
making competence (Eriksen 2007: 27), while opinion formation takes place outside the 
political system and is inserted into the system through channels and sluices (Fossum & 
Schlesinger 2007: 6). The public sphere is thus the only possible channel of influence 
for the periphery, which lacks formal instruments of power, does not make decisions, 
and does not address all aspects of a problem (Eriksen 2007: 27). However, when 
looking at the public sphere in a longer time perspective, it functions as a warning 
system with sensors that are sensitive throughout society (Habermas 1996; 359) vis-à-
vis new questions and problems visualised and verbalised by civil society organisations 
and social movements. Neither détente politics nor minority rights or third-world 
problems were taken up by the established system. Instead, they were advocated by 
social movements and their demands for change. (Eriksen 2007: 28.) 
 
Nancy Fraser’s (2007) key distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ publics captures this 
added complexity and helps to explain the ability of the public sphere to influence 
politics. Weak publics are spaces “whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in 
opinion formation and does not also encompass decision-making” (Fraser 1992: 134), 
and strong publics are spaces of institutionalised deliberation “whose discourses 
encompass both opinion formation and decision making” (ibid.). In institutional terms, 
strong publics encompass parliamentary assemblies and other deliberative entities that 
have obtained decision-making power, whereas weak publics operate in the wide sphere 
of deliberation outside the formal political system (Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 4). For 
the latter, Eriksen (2007: 28) suggests the term ‘general public sphere’: 
 
“[…] because it entails free and open access to opinion-formation processes, and 
has in many instances proven to be both ‘strong’ and powerful, as in 
revolutionary situations, constitutional moments and when bare public opinion 
has forced corrupt leaders out of office.” (ibid.) 
 
A general public sphere is, therefore, not only a space for the communicative generation 
of public opinion; it is also a vehicle for marshalling public opinion as a political force. 
By mobilising the citizenry, publicity holds officials accountable and assures that the 
actions of the state express the will of the people. Insofar as the process is inclusive and 
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fair, publicity discredits views that cannot withstand critical scrutiny and assure the 
legitimacy of those that do. (Fraser 2007: 7.) 
 
2.1.3. Contemporary challenges 
 
The classical conception of the public sphere involves two distinct ideas: it is a social 
sphere or space; and, the public sphere consists of a collective – the public. 
Consequently, the public sphere is thought to be part of a society organised as a national 
state, and, the public is made up of the members of this society: the citizenry. However, 
there is today widespread criticism of this view. (Peters 1999: 185.) Historically, a 
single authoritative public sphere, representing one collective identity has never existed 
in this strict sense (Eriksen 2007: 25). In any case, even if had existed, the idea of a 
unified national public sphere has been undermined by the processes of internal 
segmentation, as dispersed publics emerge; and external fluidity, as communication 
flows ever more freely across national boundaries (Peters 1999: 185). Thus, the 
contemporary public sphere is a common space in society that is divided into different 
types and categories (Eriksen 2007: 26). 
 
According to Habermas’s (1996: 373ff.) revised theory, the public sphere now consists 
of different assemblies, forums, arenas, scenes and meeting places where citizens can 
gather. It is a highly complex network of public sphere segments, which stretches across 
different levels, spaces and scales (Eriksen 2007: 26), and, there is a multitude of 
overlapping international, national, regional, local, and subcultural arenas. Functional 
specifications, thematic foci, policy fields, and so forth, provide the points of reference 
for a substantive differentiation of public spheres, where isolated listeners, readers and 
viewers are scattered across large geographic areas. (Habermas 1996: 374.) There are, 
furthermore, situational public spheres, where participants meet face to face; there are 
written public spheres, and there are anonymous, faceless, public spheres made possible 
by new electronic technologies. New discourses emerge and are in constant flux and 
contestation. Hence; the public sphere has become polymorphous, polyphonic and even 
anarchistic. (Eriksen 2007: 26.) 
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Today, there are, therefore, many public spheres in modern states and they are not 
confined to national borders. According to Eriksen (2007: 32), it is possible to 
distinguish between three types of publics: overarching general publics, which are 
communicative spaces of civil society in which all may participate on a free and equal 
basis and, due to proper rights entrenchment, can deliberate subject only to the 
constraints of reason; transnational segmented publics, which evolve around policy 
networks constituted by a selection of actors with a common interest in certain issues, 
problems and solutions; and strong publics, which are legally institutionalised and 
regulated discourses specialised in collective will formation at the polity centre. This 
typology of public spheres can be outlined as in the table below:  
 
 
Table 1. Typology of public spheres (Eriksen 2007: 32). 
 
Type of public Participation Legitimacy basis Function 
General Open A sovereign demos Opinion formation 
Segmented Restricted Common interests Problem-solving 
Strong Specialised Delegated Authority Will formation  
 
 
Many, who argue that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit, point to the 
underdevelopment of a general public sphere specific to the EU as being the key 
obstacle to the genuine democratisation of the EU. The internationalisation of many 
social processes, mainly in the area of economic co-operation and exchange and their 
associated externalities, has prompted a need for political regulation that transcends 
national boundaries. This in turn creates a need for legitimation for which the 
transnational formation of political opinion and political will is important. This is 
especially true for advanced transnational institutions with broad competences such as 
the European Union. (Peters 1999: 188−189.) For this reason, the development of a 
general public sphere as a link between the EU and its citizens has become a touchstone 
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for the legitimacy of the institutions of the EU (Sifft, Brüggemann, Kleinen-V. 
Königslöw, Peters & Wimmel 2007: 127−128). 
 
Whether a general public sphere exists or can exist at the European level is divided 
around different normative conceptions concerning the role of the public sphere and its 
contributions to democracy (Eder & Trenz 2007: 167). It has frequently been suggested 
that a European public sphere should not be modelled upon the national public spheres; 
instead, one should look for a Europeanisation of national public spheres (see Sifft et al. 
2007). In much of the literature, Europeanisation means that national publics transform 
themselves into a differentiated European public sphere by debating the same issues, 
above all issues concerning the EU itself, at the same time and in fairly comparable 
terms. However, parallel universes of discourses do not make a general public sphere 
(Peters 2005: 244.) capable of democratising the EU. It is, therefore, relevant to 
consider whether the European Citizens’ Initiative contribute to a more adequate model 
of European citizenship that in turn can facilitate the emergence of a general European 
public sphere.  
 
 
2.2. Views on citizenship 
 
Citizenship is the cornerstone of a democratic polity. It confers rights and duties, opens 
a door for political participation and provides a sense of belonging in a political 
community. (Lobeira 2012: 505.) Citizenship is, thus, built on three elements; a set of 
rights and duties, participation and identity (Smismans 2009: 60). These components 
constitute the basic building blocks of the concept of citizenship (Bellamy 2004: 7) and 
citizenship can, therefore, be defined as following: 
 
“Citizenship is a condition of civic equality. It consists of membership of a 
political community where all citizens can determine the terms of social 
cooperation on an equal basis. This status not only secures equal rights to the 
enjoyment of the collective goods provided by the political association but also 
involves equal duties to promote and sustain them – including the good of 
democratic citizenship itself.” (Bellamy 2008a: 17.) 
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Contemporary debates about citizenship have divided between liberal, republican and 
communitarian conceptions of citizenship (Bellamy et al. 2006: 8). Each of them 
emphasises one of the three components of citizenship as offering distinct models of 
citizenship: namely, citizenship as rights, as participation and as belonging (Beiner 
1995: 13−14). Bellamy (2004: 7) argues that the rights dimension is mainly identified 
with a liberal account of citizenship, participation with a republican account, and 
belonging with a communitarian one. While this is not a complete characterisation of 
citizenship, these ideal-typical models sum up much of how citizenship has been 
conceived (Delanty 1997: 288). 
 
For liberals, democracy is but one, and not necessarily the best means for individuals to 
exercise and secure their rights of citizenship (Bellamy & Castiglione 2008: 163). They 
focus on legal guarantees for the rational pursuit of individual interests. For them, 
citizenship is a matter of entitlement. (Giesen & Eder 2003: 4.) For republicans, on the 
other hand, citizenship is a practice that involves the active involvement of the citizen 
(Bellamy et al. 2006: 9) in common affairs and in public debate about political issues; 
only those who participate strongly in the public sphere activate their citizenship 
(Giesen & Eder 2003: 5). For communitarians, citizenship is more than rights and duties 
but also involves issues of identification (Delanty 1997: 291) and only arises when a 
people or demos share a common good and values through belonging to a relatively 
homogenous and circumscribed political community (Bellamy & Castiglione 2008: 
163). 
 
The three models of citizenship outlined above differ considerably in their requirements 
imposed on or expected of potential citizens. The liberal model of citizenship sets free 
citizenship practices (negative freedom), while the republican model puts obligations on 
citizenship practices, which is the result of the positive freedom to constitute oneself as 
a citizen. The communitarian model, on the other hand, does not require the citizens’ 
critical involvement in public affairs, but demands conformity to collective norms of 
behaviour and to commonly shared values and convictions. (Giesen & Eder 2003: 6.) 
Faulks (2000: 11) suggests a useful typology that contrasts thin or formal notions of 
citizenship with thick or substantive conceptions of citizenship. Citizenship can be thin 
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where it entails few transactions, rights and obligations; and, thick, where it occupies a 
significant share of all transactions, rights and obligations sustained by state agents and 
people living under their jurisdiction (ibid.). This is outlined in the following table: 
 
 
Table 2. Typology of citizenship (Faulks 2000: 11). 
 
Thin Citizenship Thick citizenship 
Rights privileged Rights and responsibilities as mutually 
supportive 
Passive Active 
State as a necessary evil Political community (not necessarily the 
state) as the foundation of the good life 
Purely public status Pervades public and private 
Independence Interdependence  
Freedom through choice Freedom through civic virtue 
Legal Moral 
 
 
The three models of citizenship can therefore be seen as variations on the theme of thin 
or formal versus thick or substantive dimensions of citizenship (Delanty 1997: 291), 
with the liberal tradition representing the formal dimension of citizenship with its focus 
on rights and entitlements and the republican and communitarian traditions representing 
the substantive dimension with their concern with the responsibility of the citizen for 
the community (Steenbergen 1994: 2). As a result, these models also differ in their 
conception of the legitimacy of the polity. The legitimacy of the polity compatible with 
these conceptions of citizenship is first that of a polity, which provides legal conditions 
that guarantee the functioning of the liberal model of citizenship; it is distinct from the 
polity, which provides opportunities for participation, whereas the communitarian 
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model requires a steady state of symbolic mobilisation of its members through the ritual 
staging of the political community (Giesen & Eder 2003: 6). 
 
The three models of citizenship are considered as contenders by the usual normative 
philosophy underlying this debate (Moro 2012: 38). However, such accounts of 
citizenship are doubly misleading. Even if these models give precedence to rights, 
participation or belonging, each of the ideal-typical models include aspects of all three. 
(Bellamy 2004: 7.) Furthermore, these three models are not mutually exclusive since 
“all three are needed if we are to end up with a theory of citizenship rather than mere 
subjecthood” (Bellamy 2004: 7). Instead of seeing them as distinct models of 
citizenship, they may therefore be considered as components of a more holistic model of 
citizenship (Moro 2012: 38). As a result, this paper proposes a model of citizenship 
based on the three components of rights, participation and belonging. 
 
2.2.1. Liberal citizenship 
 
Citizenship as rights is a dimension to citizenship which is mostly stressed by liberals 
(Delanty 1997: 289).  Liberal citizenship is defined primarily as a set of rights that are 
said to serve several functions. Most importantly, the possession of rights denotes 
individual autonomy. Rights give space to the individual to develop their interests and 
fulfil their potential free from interference from other individuals or from the 
community as a whole. (Faulks 2000: 56.) A citizen is, thus, a person who is the bearer 
of rights which are held against the state and the state is obliged to protect those rights 
which are the properties of individuals (Delanty 1997: 289). 
 
One of the earliest political theorists to consider the relationship between the individual 
and the political community was Thomas Hobbes. Writing in the mid-seventeenth 
century, Hobbes’s concern was primarily with issues of security and order, his focus 
being the rights of the sovereign, not the individual. (Faulks 2000: 22.) For Hobbes, 
human beings were apt to pursue their self-interest aggressively and distrust others and 
life outside the state was therefore nasty brutish and short (Bellamy 2008a: 42). 
Consequently, he believed that individuals ought willingly to surrender their rights of 
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self-government to a powerful single authority in order to ensure effective political rule 
as well as security and peace in the long term (Held 1996: 77). Hobbes’s defence of the 
sovereign’s right to absolutist power left little conceptual space of any sense of 
citizenship, and, the obligation to the common interest of the community, associated 
with citizenship, was replaced by total obedience to the state (Faulks 2000: 22). 
 
Hobbes was, nevertheless, an important evolutionary figure in the history of citizenship, 
with many of his ideas leading directly to the more developed sense of citizenship found 
in the writings of classical liberals such as John Locke (Faulks 2000: 22). Hobbes 
argued that while the subjects had an obligation and duty to obey the sovereign, the 
power of the sovereign was established by authority conferred by the people (Held 
1996: 77). This argument does not necessarily rest on an actual consent by the people; it 
is sufficient that the political and legal system is so organised that it is possible to 
imagine all citizens ought to hypothetically consent to it (Bellamy 2008a: 41). Unlike 
earlier periods, the individual is believed to enjoy a direct relationship with the state 
(Faulks 2000: 23) and it is, therefore, necessary to establish both the liberty of the 
individual and sufficient power for the state to guarantee social and political order (Held 
1996: 77). 
 
The liberal tradition was developed by John Locke who built upon Hobbes’s idea of the 
egalitarian individual’s direct relations with the state to construct a rights-based theory 
of citizenship (Faulks 2000: 23−24). Locke thought, as Hobbes had done, that the 
establishment of a political realm followed from the prior existence of individuals 
endowed with natural rights. Like Hobbes, he was concerned about what form 
legitimate government should take and about the conditions for security, peace and 
freedom. However, the way he conceived of these things was fundamentally different. 
(Held 1996: 79.) Unlike Hobbes, Locke viewed individuals as rational and self-
determining before the formation of the state (Schuck 2002: 133) and he was inclined to 
believe that Hobbes underestimated the degree to which state power might be an even 
greater danger to individual liberty than other individuals (Bellamy 2008a: 42). 
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To Locke and to the liberal theorists who followed him, private property is an essential 
condition for individual freedom (Schuck 2002: 133) and his theory aimed to balance a 
Hobbesian concern with security with the protection of private property, which he 
defined broadly as ‘Lives, Liberties, and Estates’ (Faulks 2000: 56−57). Three elements 
are central to Locke’s theory of property. First is the notion that individuals create 
property and gain dominion over it by investing it with their labour; second, the 
protection of property against public and private invasion is the most important function 
of law and government; and, third the lawful exercise of property rights naturally 
produces inequalities. (Schuck 2002: 133.) Since property rights are not always 
safeguarded in the state of nature, authority is bestowed upon government by 
individuals in society for the purpose of pursuing the ends of the governed. The 
formation of government secures the framework for freedom so that private ends of 
individuals might be met in the private realm. The creation of government is, thus, the 
burden individuals have to bear to secure their ends. (Held 1996: 81.) 
 
John Stuart Mill, writing in the mod-nineteenth century, advanced Locke’s liberal 
philosophical project with a more systematic theory of liberty (Schuck 2002: 133). He 
was a clear advocate of democracy, preoccupied with the extent of individual liberty in 
all spheres of human endeavour (Held 1996: 100). Mill’s theory regarded individuality 
and self-interest, properly understood, as the source of social, not just personal, progress 
and well-being (Schuck 2002: 133). He insisted that liberty of thought, feeling, 
discussion, and publication (Held 1996: 102) is the surest path to truth and social 
improvement. While Mill readily conceded that individuals’ freedom of action can be 
limited more than their freedom of thought, he proposed a rule that would create and 
defend a very broad domain of individual autonomy and self-promotion, while 
minimising the scope of government intervention. (Schuck 2002: 133−134.) 
 
Mills’ theory of the relationship between individual liberty and the state can be 
summarised in two propositions, albeit with considerable oversimplification. First, 
individual liberty and state action tend to be opposed; increasing the latter reduces the 
former. (Schuck 2002: 134.) Mill does recognise that some regulation and interference 
with individual liberty may be justified to prevent harm to others (Held 1996: 101) but 
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the conflict is in his view endemic. Mill’s second, and closely related, proposition is 
based on a fundamental distinction between activities, which are merely self-regarding, 
i.e. only of concern to the individual, and those that also affect the interests of others. In 
a liberal society, the pursuit of one’s own interests that do not harm others is entirely the 
province of the individual, within which one must be free to do as one please without 
the law’s interference. Where other’s interests are affected, however, the state may be 
justified in regulating the activity, although even there it should often stay its hand, out 
of prudence and a concern for individual liberty. (Schuck 2002: 134.) 
 
In the liberal tradition, the acquisition of citizenly status does, therefore, not necessitate 
abandonment of the pursuit of self-interest (Heater 1999: 6−7) and nothing is enjoined 
upon the individual beyond a respect for the autonomy of others and the minimal civic 
duties of keeping the state in being such as voting, paying taxes and, when the state is 
under threat, a readiness to come to its aid (Oldfield 1998: 77). Nor have citizens any 
defined responsibilities vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. All are equal, autonomous beings, 
so that there is no sense that the state has any organic existence, bonding the citizens to 
it and each other (Heater 1999: 6−7). The fear is the community will seek to impose 
obligations upon the individual that constrain or contradict his or her self-interest 
(Faulks 2000: 57−58), and citizenship, therefore, largely means the pursuit of one’s 
private life more comfortably because that private life is insured by state-protected 
rights (Heater 1999: 6−7). This stand in direct contrast to the holistic approach of the 
ancient Athenian polis in which in the idea of the individual having a meaningful 
existence outside the community was unthinkable and the needs of the community and 
the interests of the citizen were seen as indivisible (Faulks 2000: 57−58). 
 
In liberal theory, public and private spheres are kept distinct and citizens are under no 
obligation to participate in the public arena if they have no inclination to do so (Heater 
1999: 6). Market interactions and the pursuit of personal interest characterise the private 
realm. The market is seen as the true guarantor of individual freedom and civil rights 
protect this sphere from interference from the public realm. Liberals are, therefore, keen 
to justify such rights as liberty and property in the strongest term. (Faulks 2000: 59.) 
The function of the public realm is to serve the interest of individuals and to protect 
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citizens in the exercise of their rights as well as to leave them unhindered in the pursuit 
of personal interests (Oldfield 1998: 76). Accordingly, there is no necessary connection 
between liberalism and democracy because as long as the sovereign, whether it be a 
monarchy or democracy, does not seek to undermine civil rights, then its rule can be 
seen as legitimate (Faulks 2000: 59). 
 
Political arrangement are seen in utilitarian terms: as long as they afford the required 
protection for citizens to exercise their rights and pursue their purposes, then citizens 
have little to do politically beyond choosing who their leaders are to be. Instead, the 
duty of citizens is to abide by the authoritative decisions made by political leaders and 
when otherwise satisfactory political arrangements come under threat, the duty of 
citizens will extend to defending them. (Oldfield 1998: 76−77.) Should any government 
fail, for whatever reason, to provide freedom and security or overstep its limited powers 
and interfere in its citizens’ activities, then the citizenry has the right to rouse itself from 
the quiet pursuit of private affairs and rebel (Heater 1999: 7). One of the rights within 
this framework is the right to active political participation beyond merely voting in 
elections. However, because it is a right, citizens choose when and whether to be active 
in this way; it is no derogation from their status of citizens if they choose not to be so 
active. (Oldfield 1998: 77.) 
 
Liberal citizens are, thus, left to their own devices without much guidance from the 
state. They must decide for themselves how to use their constitutionally secured 
freedoms and, along with their fellow citizens, they must decide what kind of citizen to 
be, including the possibility that they will decide to foreswear any political activity at 
all, preferring to retreat into an entirely private world of family, friends and market 
transactions (Schuck 200: 137.), where citizenship and other political institutions are 
expedients that are only accepted conditionally, that is as long as they form conditions 
in the individual’s calculation for maximal benefit. While democracy is in danger of 
perishing from self-seeking in a liberal society (Gunsteren 1994: 39.), liberals are, 
however, correct to identify the importance of rights to citizenship since rights denote 
political agency and recognise the individual as worthy of respect and consideration 
(Faulks 2000: 74). 
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One of the classical texts on liberal citizenship is T.H. Marshall’s essay published in 
1949 under the title of Citizenship and Social Class (Steenbergen 1994: 2). In this work 
citizenship is essentially a matter of ensuring that everyone is treated as a full and equal 
member of society by granting people an increasing number of citizenship rights 
(Kymlicka & Norman 1995: 285). Marshall distinguished between three types of 
citizenship rights (Steenbergen 1994: 2), which he believed emerged in England during 
three successive centuries (Kymlicka & Norman 1995: 285) in such a way that each 
new type was standing on the shoulder of its predecessor (Steenbergen 1994: 2): 
 
“The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom – 
liberty of person; freedom of speech, thought, and faith; the right to own property 
and to conclude valid contracts; and the rights to justice. […] By the political 
element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a 
member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the 
members of such a body. […] By the social element I mean the whole range from 
the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to 
the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to 
the standards prevailing in society.” (Marshall 1998, 1963: 94) 
 
For Marshall, the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal democratic welfare 
state that ensures that every member of society feel like a full member of society by 
guaranteeing civil, political and social rights to all (Kymlicka & Norman 1995: 286). He 
argued that the right of protection under the law was incomplete without the additional 
capacity to participate in the law-making process and the right of political participation 
was inadequate unless citizens had access to the material and social resources, which 
would make it possible for them to exercise their rights (Linklater 1996: 89). It should, 
however, be stressed that there is a fundamental difference between the principles of a 
liberal and democratic society, based on civil and political rights, on the one hand, and 
the social rights as expressed in the welfare state, on the other. Liberal principles are 
generally formulated in a negative way, in terms of freedom ‘from’ something, typically 
state-intervention, whereas social rights are formulated in a positive way since they 
imply an active interventionist state. In this sense, social rights are meant to give the 
formal status of citizenship a material foundation. (Steenbergen 1994: 3.) 
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Marshall’s work has been criticised on various grounds (Newman 1996: 143). It has 
been argued that even in Britain the three sets of rights neither arose in quite the order 
or periods that he mentioned, nor proved quite as complementary as he assumed. Social 
rights, for example, have emerged in most countries before rather than after political 
rights and have, in fact, often been offered by the politically dominant class of the time 
as a way of damping down demands for political rights. Social rights can, furthermore, 
clash with certain civil rights, such as the right to property. (Bellamy 2008a: 49.) As a 
result, his work has been seen as temporally and geographically to myopic; his notion of 
citizenship as too exclusive (Heater 1999: 19) by being gender-biased, ethnocentric and 
paternalistic (Newman 1996: 143); his vision as too optimistic; his triad of rights as too 
simplistic; and his interpretation as too unhistorical (Heater 1999: 19). 
 
There is, no doubt, some validity in all these points. However, Marshall’s general 
approach has two features which are of great importance and which are acknowledged 
by most of his critics (Newman 1996: 143). First, it suggests that citizenship contains 
three elements or bundles of rights, i.e. civil, political and social rights; and second, that 
social citizenship is a vital underpinning for the other two (Heater 1999: 18). It is almost 
impossible to campaign effectively for social and economic rights if one is denied 
political rights. It is, however, equally difficult for the socially excluded to exercise their 
political rights. (Newman 1996: 144.) Today, the Marshallian concept of citizenship is, 
therefore, still a valuable tool when analysing citizenship (Steenbergen 1994: 3) and 
much of the substantial subsequent literature on liberal citizenship has taken Marshall’s 
work as its starting-point (Heater 2004: 270). 
 
2.2.2. Republican citizenship 
 
The participatory model of citizenship is closely associated with civic republican 
thought which emphasises the involvement of citizens in the building of society 
(Delanty 1997: 290) and has provided one of the most enduring traditions of citizenship 
(Delanty 2007: 64). ‘Republic’ derives from the Latin res publica, the public thing, 
matter or business (Dagger 2002: 146) and refers to a constitutional system with some 
form of sharing out of power to prevent an arbitrary and autocratic government. ‘Civic’ 
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means the involvement of the citizenry in public affairs to the mutual benefit of the 
individual and the community. (Heater 1999: 44.) Thus, in a republic, the government 
of the state or society is a public matter (Dagger 2002: 146). 
 
The republican tradition has its roots in the Athenian polis and in the Roman republic, 
where it was strongly associated with a civic conception of the political community 
(Delanty 2007: 64). It is largely inspired by the ethical and political thought of Aristotle 
(Oldfield 1998: 79), particularly his account of citizenship in The Politics, written 
approximately between 335 and 323 BC (Held 1996: 19). Citizenship practices of 
ancient Athens as commented upon by Aristotle, therefore, seem like a natural starting 
point for any discussions on participatory citizenship (Heater 1999: 44). Aristotle 
regarded human beings as political animals because it is in our nature to live in political 
communities (Bellamy 2008a: 31); only by participating directly in the affairs of the 
polis (city-state) can man reach the full potential of his life and personality (Heater 
2004: 4). A citizen is one who both rules and is ruled, that is, citizens join each other in 
making decisions where each decider respects the authority of the others and all join in 
obeying the decisions that they have made, now known as laws (Pocock 1995: 31). 
 
Aristotle’s conception of citizenship depends upon a rigorous separation of public from 
private, of polis from oikos, of persons and actions from things. To qualify as a citizen, 
the individual must be the patriarch of a household or oikos, in which the labour of 
slaves and women satisfies his material needs and leaves him free to engage in political 
relationships with his equals. The citizen, thus, leaves his household behind, maintained 
by the labour of slaves and women, but playing no further part in his concerns. What 
they discuss in the assembly is the affairs of the polis and not the oikos. (Pocock 1995: 
32.) Citizenship, therefore, entailed an escape from the oikos, the instrumental sphere of 
necessity, into the polis, the sphere of freedom where the practice of freedom, in 
collective rational and moral deliberation over a common destiny, is its own reward 
(Shafir 1998: 3). This definition of freedom as an aim sought after for its own sake 
shows that “citizenship is not just a means to being free; it is the way of being free 
itself” (Pocock 1995: 32) and has remained an enduring view of freedom (Shafir 1998: 
4). 
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The status of citizenship in the polis was highly exclusive (Faulks 2000: 18) since 
slaves would never escape from the material because they were destined to remain 
instruments, things managed by others, and women would never escape from the oikos 
because they were destined to remain managers of the slaves and other things (Pocock 
1995: 32).  To be a citizen in the Athenian polis, it was necessary to be a male aged 
twenty or over, of known genealogy as being born into an Athenian citizen family, to be 
a patriarch of a household, a warrior and a master of the labour of others, especially 
slaves (Bellamy 2008a: 31−32). As a result, large numbers were excluded from 
citizenship: women; children; immigrants, including those whose families had been 
settled in Athens for several generations although they were legally free, liable to 
taxation, and had military duties; and above all, slaves (Held 1996: 23). As a result, 
citizenship in the Athenian polis was enjoyed only by a minority. However, this was 
inevitably given the high expectations of citizens. In order to perform their extensive 
duties, it was necessary that the majority of the population were looking after their 
everyday needs. (Bellamy 2008a: 31−32.) 
 
The citizen in the polis was not only entitled to engage in civic affairs, he was expected 
to do so (Dagger 2002: 149) since Athenian democracy was marked by a general 
commitment to the principle of civic virtue: dedication to the republican city-state and 
the subordination of private life to public affairs and the common good (Held 1996: 17). 
A citizen would, therefore, have to devote the better part of his time and energy to 
public concerns. However, such devotion was necessary if he was to achieve the ideal of 
citizenship, that is, to be a self-governing member of a self-governing community. 
(Dagger 2002: 149.) The citizenry held sovereign power, i.e. supreme authority to 
engage in legislative and judicial functions. Citizenship, therefore, entailed taking a 
share in these functions, participating directly in the affairs of the state. (Held 1996: 17.) 
As Pericles, a prominent Athenian citizen, general and politician, said: “We do not say 
that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we 
say that he has no business here at all” (cited in Held 1996: 17). Consequently, the 
institutions of government provided many opportunities for the exercise of civic virtue 
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and were modelled on the maxim that all citizens should be both ruler and ruled (Faulks 
2000: 17). 
 
Important political and judicial offices were rotated through a system of lot and all 
citizens had the right to speak and vote in the political Assembly (Faulks 2000: 17). The 
Assembly (Ecclesia) met over forty times a year and required a minimum of 6,000 
citizens for plenary sessions. It is reckoned that the number of citizens in Athens 
fluctuated between 30,000 and 50,000; hence, citizens would therefore regularly have 
the opportunity to perform their civic duties. Given that juries numbered 201 or more, 
and on some occasions over 501, doing jury service was also a frequent responsibility 
for citizens. (Bellamy 2008a: 32.) All major issues such as the legal framework for the 
maintenance of public order, finance and direct taxation, declarations of war and the 
concluding of peace came before the assembled citizens for deliberation and decision. 
While unanimity was always sought in the belief that problems could only be resolved 
correctly in the common interest, obstinate issues was allowed to go to a formal vote 
with majority rule. However, the ideal remained consensus. (Held 1996: 21.) 
 
In recent years, interest in the republican citizenship has revived, partly because of 
perceived weaknesses in or objections to the liberal conception of citizenship (Heater 
1999: 69) and the tendency to reduce politics to the market place (Dagger 2002: 152), 
and, partly, because of the putative intrinsic values of civic republicanism. Republicans 
argue that the liberal form of citizenship tends to focus on individual freedom and 
rights. (Heater 1999: 69−72.) If citizens are merely seen as consumers and the political 
order is merely a mechanism for coordinating and aggregating the citizens’ preferences 
(Dagger 2002: 153), civic virtue is submerged by selfishness (Heater 1999: 72) and 
individual freedom is in danger of being lost. One cannot be a free person, unless one is 
a citizen of a free, self-governing political community, and such a community cannot be 
sustained unless a substantial number of citizens undertake the active life of the public-
spirited citizen (Dagger 2002: 154). For republicans, “a society of selfish individuals is, 
at its extreme, no society at all, nor does it have citizens” (Heater 1999: 72). 
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There is a sense in which all revivals are, however, backward-looking, and one may 
wonder whether the attempt to revive the republican ideal of citizenship looks so far 
back as to be unrealistic as well as pose a threat to an open, egalitarian, and pluralistic 
society (Dagger 2002: 154). Even Aristotle acknowledged that the republican 
conception of citizenship was likely to be possible only in fairly small city-states. 
Furthermore, critics of this model of citizenship argue that it was not so much an ideal 
as hopelessly idealised. In reality, it was doubly oppressive. One the one hand, it rested 
on the oppression of slaves, women, and other non-citizens. And on the other hand, it 
was oppressive of citizens in demanding they sacrifice their private interests to the 
service of the state. (Bellamy 2008a: 33−35.) Even the proponents of civic 
republicanism accept that their expectations are very demanding since republican 
citizenship requires conscientious application (Heater 1999: 73). 
 
Citizenship in these terms is difficult to achieve in the modern world (Oldfield 1998: 
86) as most people lead a very full life with their family commitments, leisure, pursuits 
and employment (Heater 1999: 73). According to Oldfield (1998: 86), citizens lack the 
resources for engaging in the practice of citizenship; they lack the opportunities; and 
they lack the motivation. Yet, the republican citizen must allocate time, summon up the 
energy and generate commitment to an involvement in public affairs. Citizenship 
properly speaking, thus, becomes an elite activity, the rest of the populace relegated to a 
merely nominal citizenly status. The reason for this is that normally only the well-
educated and the adequately wealthy have the inclination and time to participate in 
politics. (Heater 1999: 73.) As a result, republican citizenship has a holistic nature that 
is perhaps hard to appreciate in our own time, where politics is viewed with suspicion, 
and obligation is seen as at best a necessary evil, at worst and infringement of personal 
freedom (Faulks 2000: 18). 
 
2.2.3. Communitarian citizenship 
 
The communitarian conceptualisation of citizenship strongly emphasises that being a 
citizen means belonging to a historically developed community. Individuality is derived 
from the community and determined in terms of it. (Gunsteren 1994: 41.) While 
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communitarianism is a diffuse category and can mean many different things, it is in 
general associated with a particular North American obsession with community as an 
antidote to the liberal emphasis on the individual (Delanty 1998: 38). A number of very 
distinguished scholars have associated themselves with and worked on the concept of 
communitarianism, albeit with slightly different personal nuances of interpretation: they 
include Amitai Etzioni, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor (Heater 
1999: 77). In rejecting both individualist ideas as well as authoritarian practices, 
communitarians point to the need for a new agenda for politics and citizenship. They set 
out the ways in which a much more inclusive form of community should be developed, 
socially and politically, to overcome the corrosive effects of individualism and protect 
all citizens from authoritarian threats. (Tam 1998: 2.) 
 
The idea of community is central to a theory of citizenship since citizenship implies in 
the most general sense membership of a political community (Delanty 1998: 33). The 
classic work on community is Ferdinand Tönnies’s (1963) Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft published in 1887. In this work, community and society are pitted against 
each other to the detriment of the latter: ‘community’ refers to the organic and cohesive 
traditional world, while ‘society’ signifies the fragmented world of modernity with its 
rationalised, intellectualised and individualised structures (Delanty 20002: 160). For 
Tönnies, community is a personal form of social relationship based on deeper cultural 
values (Biegon 2010: 3). It captures a social relationship that is characterised by an 
“intimate, private and exclusive living together […]” (Tönnies 1963: 33) in which 
tradition plays a central role and which is threatened by processes of modernisation 
(Biegon 2010: 3). A society, on the other hand, is conceived of as a “mere coexistence 
of people independent of each other” (Tönnies 1963: 34), representing a more 
impersonal interest-based form of social relationship (Biegon 2010: 3). 
 
Tönnies regarded communities as culturally integrated totalities while society is defined 
by its parts. He regretted the passing of community – the world of the village and the 
rural community – and the arrival of society – the world of the city, believing that 
community could supply the individual with greater moral resources. (Delanty 2002: 
160.) Tönnies contended that in the small scale communities that predated 
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industrialisation, social life was simple; values were stable, norms freely shared, 
standards respected and deviance rare. In contrast, society comprises a condition where 
chaos prevails because norms and values are uncertain and unremittingly subject to 
drastic change. As conflicts disrupt daily life, civic bonds are dissolved (Newman & 
Zoysa 1997: 624.) and everyone looks after his or her personal interests (Biegon 2010: 
3). For Tönnies community, thus, suggests a strong sense of place, proximity and 
totality, while society suggests fragmentation, alienation and distance (Delanty 1998: 
35). 
 
The communitarian conception of citizenship entails a strong association between 
community and tradition and presupposes a view of community as a culturally cohesive 
totality (Delanty 1998: 38−39). Communities are marked by historicity and identity, that 
is, by shared experience and a sense of shared fate; but they are also rooted in the 
experience of mutuality that creates the moral infrastructure of cooperation (Selznick 
1998: 19). Communitarianism, therefore, closely resembles Tönnies’s conceptualisation 
of community, although communitarians have been mainly inspired by Aristotle’s 
conception of the polis (Newman & Zoysa 1997: 624). Since the political community is 
defined by its cultural ties and historical traditions, which exist prior to the state, the 
state merely becomes the expression of a cultural community (Delanty 1997: 291). Even 
when the emphasis is not on an underlying cultural community, there is the assumption 
that citizenship must rest on an underlying moral order that is prior to the political 
community (Delanty 2002: 160). 
 
Communitarians are reacting against both the credo of liberal individualism and the 
interpretation of citizenship as the enjoyment of rights (Heater 1999: 77). When 
communitarianism emerged during the nineteen-eighties, communitarians questioned 
the claim of the priority of the right over the good and the picture of the freely-choosing 
individual it embodied. They argued that it is not possible to justify political 
arrangements without reference to common purposes and ends and that one cannot 
understand personhood without reference to our role as citizens and as participants in a 
common life. (Christodoulidis 1998: 1.) For communitarians, liberal premises are overly 
individualistic and ahistorical, insufficiently insensitive to the social sources of selfhood 
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and obligations; too much concerned with rights, too little concerned with duty, virtue 
and responsibility; and too ready to accept a thin and anaemic conception of the 
common good (Selznick 1998: 16). 
 
Communitarians believe that persons are embedded in communities, their identity 
constituted by their membership of a community (Caney 1992: 274). According to 
Sandel (1982: 274), people “conceive their identity – the subject and not just the object 
of their feelings and aspirations as defined to some extent by the community of which 
they are part. For them, community describes not just what they have as fellow citizens 
but also what they are […].” The emphasis of liberalism on individual liberty and rights 
are seen by communitarians to ignore the social nature of the person and the value of 
community (Caney 1992: 273). For communitarians, the self is always culturally 
specific (Delanty 2002: 163) and they reject the existentialist idea that persons can 
attain complete distance from their culture (Caney 1992: 275). The communitarian 
conception of citizenship is, therefore, closely linked to culture and in particular 
national identity (Delanty 1997: 291). 
 
The difference between communitarians and liberals should, however, not be 
exaggerated since what has “often been at issue is less substantive differences than 
differences in metatheoretical justification and methodology” (Delanty 2002: 163). 
According to Caney (1992: 289), much of the debate was, in fact, misplaced because 
neither side realised how much they had in common. Communitarians are not opposed 
to rights; they acknowledge that no society can function without them and that claims of 
rights have often been effective engines of moral and institutional improvement. What 
communitarians reject is an excess of rights-centeredness marked by a detachment of 
rights from responsibilities and context. (Selznick 1998: 17.) The theoretical debate has 
therefore moved on from the ‘thick’ communitarian critique of ‘thin’ liberalism to 
positions that combine elements of both (Christodoulidis 1998: 2); for this reason the 
communitarian position is perhaps best termed ‘liberal communitarianism’ since these 
are no longer exclusive positions (Delanty 2002: 163). 
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Liberal communitarianism is, today, especially associated with the work of one of the 
best known communitarian thinkers, Charles Taylor, whose Sources of the Self (1989) 
has become a major statement of the political philosophy of communitarianism. In 
rejecting moral individualism for a group conception of citizenship, liberal 
communitarians frequently define their conception of the self in terms of minority or 
majority status within the polity. (Delanty 2002: 163.) For Taylor (1994: 32), the crucial 
feature of social life is its dialogical character, for the encounter between the self and 
‘significant others' is embedded in a shared language. In this encounter what is of 
central importance is a discourse of recognition since identity crucially depends on 
dialogical relations with others (bid. 34). With respect to the politics of recognition this 
can take the form of an emphasis on equality, or an emphasis on difference, the need of 
the majority culture to make concessions to particular groups, generally minorities but 
also, and more importantly for communitarians, for the state to give official recognition 
to cultural community, be it that of the majority or minority (Delanty 2002: 164), i.e., 
while the politics of universal dignity fights for forms of non-discrimination that are 
“quite “blind” to the ways in which citizens differ, the politics of difference often 
redefines discrimination as requiring that we make these distinctions the basis for 
differential treatment” (Taylor 1994: 39). 
 
Taylor, however, is cautious about polarising the principles of liberal equality and 
communitarian difference; he stands for a liberal communitarianism that seeks to 
modify liberalism by compelling it to accommodate the reality of cultural difference and 
the need for the preservation of cultural community (Delanty 2002: 164) While liberals 
get around the problem of protecting minority groups by a commitment to group rights 
(Kymlicka 1998: 172−174), liberal communitarians are on the whole more concerned 
with protecting the majority culture, which is not an issue for liberals, since this is 
largely taken for granted. In communitarian discourse, the concept of community is that 
of the dominant culture which is officially recognised by the state. Since political 
community, in which citizenship exists, rests on a prior cultural community, minorities 
must adapt to this community in order to participate in its political community. Liberal 
communitarianism is, therefore, simply forcing liberalism to make explicit the existence 
of the cultural community that underlies political community. (Delanty 2002: 164−165.)  
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While liberal communitarianism is largely a modification of liberalism in its advocation 
of a politics of recognition for particular and culturally defined groups (Delanty 2002: 
167), Amitai Etzioni (1993) argues for the need to recover a sense of community in The 
Spirit of Community. His idea of community is expressed in terms of personal proximity 
(Delanty 1998: 40); it is a moral voice rooted in a set of social virtues and some basic 
settled values that the community endorses and actively affirms (Etzioni 1993: 25). His 
call for a recovery of community is intended to create a sense of responsibility, identity 
and participation in order to make citizenship meaningful in a society that has become 
highly depoliticized and to which the state has become irrelevant (Delanty 2002: 167). 
Etzioni sees the family and the school as typical institutions which can cultivate the 
kind of citizenship required by a responsive community (Delanty 1998: 41). 
 
Etzioni (1993) is not arguing for a romantic return to the traditional community of the 
past (Delanty 2002: 167). He believes that modern economic prerequisites preclude 
such a shift, but even if it were possible, such backpedalling would be undesirable since 
traditional communities have been too constraining and authoritarian. Furthermore, such 
traditional communities were usually very homogenous. (Etzioni 1993: 122.) Instead, 
Etzioni’s version of community is intended to be compatible with diversity and social 
differentiation (Delanty 1998: 41): 
 
“[…] communities are best viewed as if they were Chinese nesting boxes, in 
which less encompassing communities (families, neighbourhoods) are nestled 
within more encompassing ones (local villages and towns), which in turn are 
situated within still more encompassing communities, the national and cross-
national ones (such as the budding European Community). Moreover, there is 
room for nongeographic communities that criss-cross the others, such as 
professionals or work-based communities. When they are intact, they are all 
relevant, and all lay moral claims on us by appealing to and reinforcing our 
values.” (Etzioni 1993: 32.) 
 
Although Etzioni (1993) explicitly states that he is not advocating a nostalgic return to 
the past, it is significant that he constantly uses the term a ‘return’ to community or a 
‘recovery’ of community, thus, making the assumption that community was a thing of 
the past and the present is all the poorer for letting it pass. He recognises that complex 
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societies with many different cultural traditions cannot easily form the basis of 
community, and, although the city, not the village is his concern, his model is ultimately 
based on the idea of the traditional community. His definition of community as a moral 
voice rooted in social virtues and personal responsibility are, therefore, not compatible 
with his view of community as being also highly differentiated. It is ultimately a re-
appropriation of the traditional idea of community as a cohesive unity. (Delanty 2002: 
167−168.) 
 
Critics of communitarianism have worried on academic grounds that communitarians 
have failed to provide a clear definition of what they mean by community (Heater 1999: 
78). Furthermore, awareness of the usefulness or the necessity of a community does not 
provide a sufficiently strong basis for the maintenance of such a community, nor for 
belonging to it. In modern societies, communities cannot be taken for granted since 
there is a plurality of communities and of individual combinations of memberships. 
(Gunsteren 1994: 42.) Yet, the whole reality of multiple identities would seem to be 
underplayed in the communitarian conceptualisation of community. For 
communitarians, the integration of a community involves an implied rejection of the 
‘strangers’ who are not members and implies that all who are members share the same 
interests, although that it not necessarily the case. (Heater 1999: 78.) Communitarians, 
thus, reduce citizenship too much to an organic notion of cultural community (Delanty 
1998: 33). 
 
Another objection to the communitarian perspective is less concerned with how realistic 
it is than how desirable it is (Gunsteren 1994: 42). Communitarianism has the smack of 
an authoritarian firming up of the status quo, even a retrogression to some supposed 
more attractive age (Heater 1999: 78). It places notorious restrictions on freedom 
(Gunsteren 1994: 42) since many of the solutions offered by communitarians risk 
negating some of the positive steps towards emancipation made by women for example 
(Faulks 2000: 72). Emancipation has often meant deliverance from the compelling and 
unjust bondage of community (Gunsteren 1994: 42) and a return to traditional family 
structures risks recreating the division between women as carers and men as active 
citizens (Faulks 2000: 72). 
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Community is, however, an important basis for citizenship since citizenship as 
membership of political community must draw on something more basic than politics 
(Delanty 2002: 171). In this sense, the communitarian critique of liberalism is relevant. 
The liberal conception of citizenship does not exhaust all that can be said of the 
relationship between individuals and society since individuals do not only conceive of 
themselves as bearing rights, nor is their posture toward forms of collective life purely 
instrumental. In particular, individuals recognise that they have duties that extend 
further than the minimally civic ones and respect for others, and which are associated 
with the fact that they identify themselves socially – as parents and children; as 
neighbours and friends; as acknowledging a common nationality. (Oldfield 1998: 78.) 
Communitarians also argue that communitarian remedies for the fragmentation of 
communities have nothing to do with imposing past traditions; instead, they are 
concerned with realising the full potential of community life (Tam 1998: 25). 
 
 
2.3. Summary 
 
From the normative perspective of democratic theory, a general public sphere providing 
an interface between state and society is a crucial feature of a democratic polity. This is 
so because the public sphere is a common space in society in which individuals gather 
as politically equal citizens to express their common concerns, interests and 
expectations. In a democratic polity, legitimate political power stems from the will of 
the citizenry. Citizenship is, therefore, both a constitutive element of the public sphere 
and a prerequisite. According to normative political theories, citizenship is composed of 
rights and duties, participation and identity. Indeed, all three components are necessary 
for an adequate model of citizenship. As a result, a functioning democratic public 
sphere is dependent on citizens equipped with civil, political and social rights, 
opportunities for citizens to participate directly in the decision-making processes and 
citizens sharing a collective identity. Based on this reasoning, the paper proposes the 
following normative model of democracy: 
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The normative model developed in this paper serves as a normative point of reference 
that will guide the analysis of European citizenship, which is the empirical point of 
reference in this paper. In the remainder of this paper, it will be questioned whether it 
can at least be plausible assumed that the ECI provides a normative solution to the 
democratic deficit by contributing to a more adequate model of European citizenship. 
 
  
Figure 2. Normative model of democracy 
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3. AN ASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP 
 
In the light of permanent accusations concerning the EU’s democratic deficit, one 
cannot underestimate the potential of European citizenship as a facilitator of democracy 
in the EU. The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty 
(Glogowski & Maurer 2013: 7) as a means of strengthening citizen involvement in the 
decision-making (Conrad 2011: 5). The ECI is regarded as a novel instrument since 
republican notions of participation has thus far been the Achilles heel of European 
citizenship (Bellamy 2006: 9). In the previous section, citizenship has been 
conceptualised in terms of rights and duties, participation and identity. As a result, the 
ECI seems to be a step in the direction of a more holistic approach to European 
citizenship. If this is the case, then the ECI has the potential to revolutionise European 
citizenship, thereby, contributing to the facilitation of a general European public sphere. 
 
 
3.1. Views on the democratic deficit 
 
The dominant frame for current debates about democracy in the European Union is that 
of the democratic deficit (Isin & Saward 2013: 11). Research on the democratic deficit 
has been informed by a variety of analytical and normative perspectives (Greven 2000: 
37). There is, therefore, still very little agreement on what constitutes the democratic 
deficit despite years of academic debate, and much less on what can be done to 
overcome it or even if there is any real interest in overcoming it to begin with (Conrad 
2011: 15). The discourse on the democratic deficit largely emerged in the early 1990s, 
but already the famous Tindemans Report from 1975 pointed out the lack of public 
support for European integration as well as the need to raise citizens’ awareness of, and 
identification with, the European community (European Commission 1975). 
 
3.1.1. There is a democratic deficit 
 
According to Follesdal & Hix (2006), the view that the EU suffers from a democratic 
deficit is built around five key concerns. First, and foremost, European integration has 
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meant an increase in executive power and a decrease in national parliamentary control 
(ibid. 534). In general terms, Europeanisation entails extending further the powers and 
prerogatives of the executive, that is, the national officials who are the main actors in 
European cooperation (Eriksen & Fossum 2000: 5). The actions of these executive 
agents at the European level are beyond the control of national parliaments, and, as a 
result, governments can effectively ignore their parliaments when making decisions in 
Brussels (Follsedal & Hix 2006: 535). As a result, European integration has meant that 
executive power dominates the EU institutions with little parliamentary control or 
accountability (Isin & Saward 2013: 12). 
 
Second, and related to the first concern, most analysts of the democratic deficit argue 
that the European Parliament is too weak (Follesdal & Hix 535) compared to other core 
EU institutions (Isin & Saward 2013: 12) since it lacks certain rights and effective 
control over the Commission and the governments in the Council of the European 
Union (the Council) (Greven 2000: 37). Successive reforms of the EU treaties since the 
mid-1980s have dramatically increased the powers of the EP as many of the democratic 
deficit scholars had advocated (Follesdal & Hix 2006: 535). However, the EP does not 
have exclusively legislative powers and it just one more actor in the decision-making 
process within the EU (Moro 2012: 2). Furthermore, it is not able to hold the executives 
properly accountable (Eriksen & Fossum 2000: 6). 
 
Third, despite the growing power of the European Parliament, there are no ‘European’ 
elections (Follesdal & Hix 2006: 535). Voters tend to perceive elections for the EP as of 
less importance than national elections, a perception encouraged by the fact that 
electoral campaigns in the various Member States almost invariably focus on national 
issues and a national agenda (Greven 2000: 37). European elections are more precisely 
‘second order national elections’ rather than a contest in which alternative visions of 
‘Europe’ are debated about and decided upon by voters. Furthermore, EP elections have 
witnessed a steady decrease in voter turnout since the 1990s. (Scully 2003: 175−176.) 
The absence of a ‘European’ element in national and European elections means that the 
preferences of European citizens on issues on the EU policy agenda, at best, have only 
an indirect influence on EU policy outcomes (Follesdal & Hix 2006: 536). 
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Fourth, even if the powers of the EP were increased and genuine European elections 
were able to be held, another problem is that the EU is simply ‘too distant’ from voters 
(Follesdal & Hix 2006: 536). There is an institutional and a psychological version of 
this claim (Chryssochoou 2003). Institutionally, electoral control over the Council and 
the Commission is too removed, as discussed above. Psychologically, there is no 
European ‘people’, a demos that may legitimise the European institutional system as in 
the case of national states (Moro 2012: 2) but a multitude of peoples, each with a 
respective national identity and sense of belonging (Greven 2000: 37). This lack of 
unity and homogeneity undermines the possibility of the EU developing into a common 
democratic system (Moro 2012: 2). European integration has, thus, proceeded further 
that the currently existing sense of community among Europeans would allow (Conrad 
2011: 15). 
 
Fifth, European integration produces a ‘policy drift’ from voters’ ideal policy 
preferences. Partly as a result of the four precious factors (Follesdal & Hix 2006: 537), 
the EU adopts policies that lack popular support in most Member States (Isin & Saward 
2013: 12). Governments are able to undertake policies at the European level that they 
cannot pursue at the domestic level, where they are constrained by parliaments, courts 
and corporatist interest group structures (Follesdal & Hix 2006: 537). Furthermore, 
there are several non-public actors with no electoral legitimacy nor precise constituency 
with a considerable influence in the EU such as European civil servants, experts and 
private lobbyists (Moro 2012: 2) such as multinational companies. As a result, EU 
policy outcomes are skewed more towards the interests of the owners of capital than is 
the case for policy compromises at the domestic level (Follesdal & Hix 2006: 537).   
 
3.1.2. There is no democratic deficit 
 
According to the democratic deficit thesis, the main effect of such a situation is the 
citizens’ withdrawal and detachment from the democratic life at European level (Moro 
2012: 2). However, although the concern over the EU’s democratic deficit and the lack 
of citizen participation has grown in recent years (Bellamy 2008b: 607), some 
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prominent writers dispute the need to think in terms of substantive democracy at the 
level of the EU (Isin & Saward 2013: 12). Magnette (2005: 167−168), for example, 
describes the so-called democratic deficit in the EU as a ‘powerful myth’ and argues 
that the discredit that the EU is suffering is due to an ignorance of its institutions and 
functioning. Furthermore, Giandomenica Majone (1996) and Andrew Moravcsik 
(2002), two of the most prominent scholars of European integration, have criticised the 
standard version of the democratic deficit and have argued that the EU is in fact as 
democratic as it could, or should, be (Follesdal & Hix 2006: 537). 
 
Majone’s (1996: 55) starting point is his theoretical and normative claim that the EU is 
a regulatory state. The main purpose of regulation is essentially to address market 
failures and so, by definition, is about producing policy outcomes that are Pareto-
efficient (where some benefit and no one is made worse off), rather than redistributive 
or value-allocative. Governments of the Member States have delegated regulatory 
policy competences to the European level, such as the creation of the single market, 
deliberately to isolate these policies from domestic majoritarian governments. (Follesdal 
& Hix 2006: 537−538.) From this perspective, the EU is a functional type of 
organisation whose purpose is to promote the material interests of the Member States by 
means of transnational rather than supranational institutions (Fossum & Schlesinger 
2007: 12). 
 
Following from this interpretation, Majone asserts that EU policy-making should not be 
‘democratic’ in the usual meaning of the term (Follesdal & Hix 2006: 537). If European 
policies were made by majoritarian institutions (Majone 1996: 284−287), they would 
cease to be Pareto-efficient, insofar as the political majority would select EU policy 
outcomes close to its ideal short-term policy preferences and counter to the preferences 
of the political minority and against the majority’s own long-term interests (Follesdal & 
Hix 2006: 537−538). In this view, an EU dominated by the European Parliament or a 
directly elected Commission would lead to a politicization of regulatory policy-making 
(Majone 2000: 287−288). Politicization would result in redistributive rather than Pareto-
efficient outcomes, and so in fact undermine rather than increase the legitimacy of the 
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EU (Follesdal & Hix 2006: 537−538). Instead, the regulatory EU derives it democratic 
aspect from the practices of the Member States (Fossum & Schlesinger 2007: 13). 
 
Moravcsik (2002) argues that the EU does not suffer from a democratic deficit because 
of its intergovernmental nature and presents an extensive critique of all the main 
democratic deficit claims. He argues that because of constitutional checks and balances 
(ibid. 600), which ensures that it is the governments that run the EU, it is unlikely that 
the EU adopts anything, which negatively affects an important national interest. 
Furthermore, since the Commission is simply an agent of the governments, there are no 
significant unintended consequences of the intergovernmental bargains. As a result, 
there is little gap between the preferences of the elected governments and final EU 
policy outcomes; thus, the EU is not undemocratic. Just as Majone’s views of the 
democratic deficit are logical extensions of his regulatory theory, Moravcsik’s views of 
the democratic deficit are extensions of his liberal-intergovernmental theory. (Follesdal 
& Hix 2006: 541.) 
 
Moravcsik (2002), furthermore, agrees with Majone that it is a good thing that 
regulatory policy-makers are isolated from democratic majorities. Firstly, “universal 
involvement in government policy would impose costs beyond the willingness of any 
modern citizens to bear” (ibid. 614). Secondly isolating particular quasi-judicial 
decisions is essential to protect minority interests and avoid the ‘tyranny of the 
majority’ (Follesdal & Hix 2006: 541). Thirdly, and above all, isolated policy-makers 
can provide majorities with unbiased representation. Here, Moravscik (2002: 614) 
argues that powerful particularist (concentrated) minorities with powerful an immediate 
interests can more easily capture electoral processes than isolated regulators or courts. 
From this perspective, the EU may be more ‘representative’ precisely because it is, in a 
narrow sense, less ‘democratic’ (ibid.). 
 
From the discussion above, it becomes clear that the notion of the democratic deficit as 
well as the legitimate role of European citizens in the governance of Europe depends on 
how the EU’s future political order is envisioned (Olsen 2003: 91). The EU as a 
regulatory entity or an international organisation can dispense with the question of a 
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European public sphere and a more holistic approach to citizenship. Both remain 
exclusively at the level of the national state. If, however, as the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) successfully claims, the EU represents the sovereign centre of governance, 
then the issue of European citizenship comes to the fore and a debate about the 
democratic deficit can hardly be avoided. (Giesen & Eder 2003: 1.) Thus, the more the 
EU is moving away from a special purpose organisation with limited tasks, 
responsibilities and powers, and transforming itself into a full-blown polity (Olsen 
2003: 91), the more important it becomes to assess the potential of European citizenship 
as a solution to the democratic deficit, and, whether the European Citizens’ Initiative 
contributes to this concept. 
 
 
3.2. The ECI as a solution to the democratic deficit 
 
A key vehicle to overcome the democratic deficit, in the Commission’s eyes, is the 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), which first emerged in discussions about the 
Constitutional Treaty (Saward 2013: 221) as a surprising deviation from “the dominant 
tendency to define participation in terms of representation through associations” in the 
European Union (Smismans 2004: 136). The ECI carries the dual ambition to increase 
awareness of the status of European citizenship (Saward 2013: 221−222) and to 
establish an opportunity structure for participatory democracy (European Commission 
2010: 2). 
 
Formally, the European Commission has the exclusive right of legislative initiative in 
the EU1, although both the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 
also have the right to request legislative proposals from the Commission. However, the 
ECI now gives European citizens a similar right to ask the Commission to submit a 
legislative proposal. (Conrad 2011: 5.) According to Article 11(4) TEU: 
 
                                                          
1 ) There are two narrow exceptions to this rule: 1) foreign and security policy, where the right of 
initiative belongs to the Member States and the High Representative (Article 30 TEU); and 2) justice and 
home affairs, for which the Commission shares the right of legislative initiative with one-quarter of the 
Member States (Article 76 TFEU) (Glogowski & Maurer 2013: 8). 
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“Not less than one million citizens who are national of a significant number of 
Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, 
within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on 
matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the 
purpose of implementing the Treaties.” (European Union 2012) 
 
The ECI is based on two legal documents: the ECI was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, 
which has been in force since December 2009 (Conrad 2011: 5); at the same time, the 
Lisbon Treaty left the specifics of the ECI to be determined in a Regulation published in 
March 2010 (Saward 2013: 222). The most basic of these formal requirements in the 
Lisbon Treaty and the Regulation include that any given citizens’ initiative must be 
signed by at least one million European citizens from at least one-third of the Member 
states. Furthermore, the signatures must be collected within a twelve-month period. The 
citizens’ initiative also needs to be drawn up by a citizens’ committee made up of at 
least seven individuals residing in at least seven Member States. Finally, the proposed 
legislation has to be within the scope of the EU’s competences and cannot amount to 
any treaty changes. (Conrad 2011: 5.) However, some of these provisions remain 
controversial (Saward 2013: 222). 
 
A point that needs to be stressed concerns the relationship between the ECI and the 
formal right of legislative initiative in the EU (Conrad 2011: 10). The ECI does not 
affect the exclusive right of legislative initiative that is exercised by the Commission. In 
this sense, the ECI should by no means be confused with a Swiss-style popular 
initiative, which would grant the right to a number of citizens to submit a draft 
legislative provision to voters with no possibility of it being blocked by the parliament 
or the Commission as in the case of the ECI. Instead, the ECI is a tool for a popular 
appeal to the Commission to initiate legislation. (Auer 2005: 80.) As a consequence, the 
Commission cannot be forced to adopt an ECI in the form in which it is submitted, or to 
adopt it at all. However, the Regulation on the ECI does force the Commission to give 
serious consideration to each initiative that fulfils the formal requirements. If the 
Commission decides not to act on a given ECI, it will have to explain its reasons for not 
doing so. (Conrad 2011: 10.) 
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As mentioned above, the citizens’ initiatives have to be within the competences of the 
European Union, i.e., legislative acts have to be required for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties, as well as within the areas where the Commission actually 
enjoys the right of initiative. Consequently, no ECI would be able to change e.g., the 
number of votes that must be collected for a citizens’ initiative, or the very fact that 
there is a European Citizens’ Initiative. As the ECI is legislative and not constitutional 
(Auer 2005: 82), an ECI cannot change the existing treaties, i.e., it cannot make 
fundamental changes to the EU political system, including the treaty provisions on the 
ECI. On the other hand, the ECI could be used to change the Regulation itself, for 
instance to lower the significant number of Member States in which signatures have to 
be collected. Since the ECI can, furthermore, only be requested in areas in which the 
Commission has the right to propose legislation, the citizens’ initiatives cannot propose 
legislation in areas that are Member States competences, e.g., the EU cannot set 
European-wide minimum wages, unless Member States decide to change the treaties 
accordingly. (Conrad 2011: 11.) 
 
The Commission is vesting many hopes in the ECI, viewing it as a significant symbolic 
and practical advance for European citizenship (Saward 2013: 222) by giving European 
citizens an agenda setting role in the legislative process and by creating a common 
political space. For, in addition to creating a culture of dialogue and giving citizens a 
voice, it initiates a new political reality of EU citizens being in mutual recognition vis-à-
vis one another and engaging in reciprocal co-determination of the European Union 
legislative process. (Kostakopoulou 2013: 12−13.) According to the Commission, it 
“introduces a whole new dimension of participatory democracy alongside that of 
representative democracy on which the Union is founded” (Commission 2010: 2). 
Through its implicit appeal to a broader political space beyond national communities, 
the ECI essentially encourages citizens from several Member States to act on 
commonalities that transcend their national identities and to initiate legislative change 
from below (Kostakopoulou 2013: 13). According to the Green Paper on European 
Citizens’ Initiative (European Commission: 3): 
 
“The European Commission welcomes the introduction of the citizens’ initiative, 
which will give a stronger voice to European citizens by giving them the right to 
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call directly on the Commission to bring forward new policy initiatives. It will add 
a new dimension to European democracy, complement the set of rights related to 
the citizenship of the Union and increase public debate around European politics, 
helping to build a genuine European public space.” (ibid.) 
 
Clearly, the ECI has a number of distinct and weighty aspirations and expectations to 
carry (Saward 2013: 223). The Commission evidently sees the ECI as a mean to foster 
active citizenship and democratic participation (Commission 2010: 2). The weaknesses 
in EU citizenship that it is designed to address are widely acknowledged by 
commentators (Saward 2013: 223). Warleigh (2006: 119) argues that in the context of 
European integration, Member State nationals remain primarily consumers, workers or 
travellers rather than politically active and empowered citizens. The ECI addresses 
citizens directly, rather than, as previously, seeking to foster active citizenship primarily 
through organised civil society organisations (Smismans 2009), a strategy that, it has 
been argued, has had limited success (Warleigh 2006: 128). In the context of the 
democratic deficit, the ECI can, therefore, be understood as establishing a formal and 
direct link between the Commission and EU citizens, perhaps bolstering the EU’s 
democratic credentials by bypassing problems with representative institutions and 
processes, e.g., perceptions of a weak European Parliament (Saward 2013: 224). 
 
It is, however, important to pinpoint that the ECI does not introduce an element of 
‘direct’ democracy because ordinary citizens do not get to vote on particular policies; 
they only get to put ideas forward to the Commission. The ECI is, thus, a device which 
may enhance participatory democracy, not direct democracy. (Saward 2013: 226.) 
Direct democracy has long been part of the dichotomy between representative and direct 
democracy, referring to both the classical city-state democracy of Athens and the 
referendum model (Smismans 2004: 128); it is best understood as a political procedure 
in which collective decisions are made directly by citizens, either in a face to face 
setting or in referendums (Saward 2013: 227). Direct and participatory democracy both 
refer to a democratic system in which individuals participate personally in the 
deliberations which concern them, in which there is no intermediary between those who 
make the decisions and those affected by them. However, the concept of participatory 
democracy is often extended from the political world to other sectors of social life, such 
as the workplace and education. (Smismans 2004: 128.) Participatory democracy, 
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therefore, includes any form of democracy which emphasises participation in decision-
making without necessarily involving a formal element of power of decision by those 
whose participation is fostered in some way (Saward 2013: 227). 
 
Nonetheless, from an institutional perspective, the ECI is important since it may be able 
to stimulate a form of collective action, which neither the Council of the European 
Union nor the European Parliament are able to provide. Such endorsements could 
possibly induce EU institutions and European citizens to start pan-European campaigns 
and debates, thus leading public opinion at the national level into a more meaningful 
form of collective action in the EU. (Glogowski & Maurer 2013: 21−22.) However, 
according to the normative model of democracy proposed in this paper, the ECI alone 
cannot facilitate the emergence of a European public sphere since it only addresses one 
aspect of citizenship, namely participation. In order to examine its potential as a 
facilitator of democracy, it is necessary to examine its contribution to European 
citizenship. The paper therefore goes on to examine European citizenship from the 
perspective of normative theories of citizenship.  
 
 
3.3. European Citizenship 
 
The doubts about where to look for the relevant signs of European citizenship attest to 
the difficulties in grasping its essence. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that 
European citizenship is essentially a process and is for now an unfinished project, open 
to different developments. It is, therefore, crucial to avoid reducing the “sites” of 
citizenship to only the EU Treaties. (Moro 2012: 38−39.) Warleigh (2001: 20−21) 
alerts: “Union citizenship is about more than the Treaty. It resides in secondary 
legislation as much as summit-agreed documents, in a ‘practice’ of citizenship as much 
as formal entitlements and duties.” According to Antje Wiener (1998), European 
citizenship cannot be studied without taking into account its fundamental practical 
dimension. The concept of citizen practice, defined as the dynamic citizen-polity 
relation, refers to two aspects: the political link between the citizen and the political 
community (i.e., political rights of representation and participation) and the identity-
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based link between the citizen and the political community that is built on a sense of 
membership resulting from everyday experiences of participation, i.e., the emotional 
belonging (ibid. 7). 
 
According to Moro (2012: 39), it is possible to identify three observation “sites” of 
European citizenship based on these two elements. The first observation “site” is the 
Treaties of the European Union (ibid.). Interpreting the Treaties, either maximally or 
minimally, can, however, only reveal part of the picture since European citizens have 
rights and legal protections, which stem not only from the Treaties but also from 
secondary legislation (Warleigh 2001: 26−27). The second observation “site” of 
European citizenship is, therefore, the so-called Acquis communautaire (Moro 2012: 
39), which can be defined as following: 
 
“The Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations which bind 
all the Member States together within the European Union. It is constantly 
evolving and comprises: the content, principles and political objectives of the 
Treaties; the legislation adopted in application of the Treaties and the case law of 
the Court of Justice; the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; 
measures relating to the common foreign and security policy; measures relating 
to justice and home affairs; and international agreements concluded by the 
Community and those concluded by the Member States between themselves in the 
field of the Union’s activities.”2 
 
EU citizenship is, thus, scattered throughout the acquis rather than encapsulated in 
Articles 17−22 (Warleigh 2001: 27) and every measure with a legal value or that of a 
general direction, whether normative or political, is both a source and a repository of 
information about European citizenship (Moro 2012: 40). Finally, European citizenship 
is now perforce part of Member State nationals’ lived experience (Warleigh 2001: 27), 
and, it is, therefore, possible to identify in the everyday practices of dynamic 
relationship between the citizen and the political community (Wiener 1998: 7) a 
privileged observation “site” of European citizenship (Moro 2013: 40). 
 
                                                          
2 ) http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/community_acquis_en.htm (last access: 1st April 
2014) 
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3.3.1. The individualist dimension 
 
The Maastricht Treaty awarded all nationals of the Member States of the European 
Union the complementary status of EU citizenship (Jenson 2007: 59). According to 
Article 17 (1) EC, “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace 
national citizenship.” The reference to the nationalities of the Member States was 
introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam (Moro 2012: 39) and has two implications. First, 
EU citizenship has a derivative nature since the holding of nationality of a Member 
States is a prerequisite for acquiring it. Second, EU citizenship has a complementary 
nature as it is not meant to replace national citizenship. (Besson & Utzinger 2008: 190.) 
The provision, therefore, aims at emphasising the dependence of EU citizenship on 
national citizenship (Moro 2012: 39), which remains a matter for the Member States 
themselves to determine (Bellamy et al. 2006: 11). However, in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), EU citizenship is now defined as 
additional to national citizenship (Article 20). 
 
Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, EU citizens have enjoyed a number of 
rights that are directly conveyed by and enforceable throughout the EU (Wiener 2003: 
399). According to Article 17(2) EC, the rights of EU citizens are all those which are 
guaranteed by the EC Treaty and secondary legislation. Thus, the benefits of EU 
citizenship are not limited to the rights conferred by Articles 18−21 EC, which are not 
exhaustive. EU citizenship is evolutionary and can expand to new rights together with 
the expansion of the scope of the EC Treaty. (Besson & Utzinger 2008: 191.) In fact, an 
enhancement mechanism or evolutionary clause is introduced in Article 22 EC stating 
that the Council may adopt provisions to strengthen or to add to the list of rights (Moro 
2012: 39−40). The concept of EU citizenship has, thus, been explicitly designed to be 
developed further (Besson & Utzinger 2008: 191). Furthermore, according to Article 17 
(2) EC, EU citizens not only enjoy the rights but are also subject to the duties 
established in the Treaties. It is however noticeable that the Treaties lack a list of duties 
corresponding to rights such as the constitutional treaties of the Member States have, for 
example, stating the duty to pay taxes or to serve in the army (Moro 2012: 41). 
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The formal citizenship rights established in the EC Treaty cover the following areas 
(Bellamy et al. 2006: 11): rights to residence and free movement enjoyed by all citizens 
of the Union (Article 18 EC); rights on the part of citizens of the Member States to vote 
and stand in local and European parliamentary elections when resident in another 
member state (Article 19 EC); right to diplomatic and consular protection when on the 
territory of a third country on the part of any Member State which has an embassy or 
consulate in that state (Article 20 EC); and, rights to petition the European Parliament, 
to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to write to the institutions in their own 
language and receive a reply in that language (Article 21 EC). Further to these 
provisions, there are a number of other articles in the Treaties that relate either directly 
or indirectly to the citizens of the EU (Wiener 2003: 399) such as the right of access to 
documents, under conditions laid down in the legislation, and the general principle of 
transparency (although the latter term is not explicitly mentioned in the Treaty). 
However, like the rights of access and engagement with the Union institutions, these 
rights are not limited to EU citizens, but are granted to all natural and legal persons 
resident in the EU. (Bellamy et al. 2006: 11.) 
 
Many of the articles constituted a codification of the existing Treaty position on citizen 
rights, rather than conferring significant decisions (Newman 1996: 154) since the 
general background to EU citizenship was already provided by the original EEC Treaty 
with its provisions on free movement of workers, and secondary legislation (Bellamy et 
al. 2006: 10). More generally, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) used the two legal 
principles of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 12 EC) and freedom 
of movement (Article 18 EC) (Besson & Utzinger 2008: 192) as the basis for extending 
protection for citizens of the Member States when either visiting or taking up residence 
in other Member States (Bellamy et al. 2006: 10). In particular, the ECJ constantly 
developed the social dimension of EU citizenship, thus, gradually turning it into a 
source of rights of its own already before the introduction of the formal concept of EU 
citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty (Besson & Utzinger 2008: 191). 
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Notable cases in this area include Cowan3 and Gravier4(Bellamy et al. 2006: 10). In 
Cowan, the ECJ held that a British visitor to Paris, who was attacked on the Metro, was 
entitled on the same basis as French nationals to the French criminal injuries 
compensation fund. The decision by the ECJ appears to create something close to a 
general right of free movement for nationals of Member States, since it seems that by 
the mere fact of moving the citizen will inevitably satisfy the minimum threshold for the 
consumption of services when staying in one of the Member States so as to fall within 
the scope of the Treaty. (Downes 2001: 98.)  In Gravier, the Court held that a French 
national studying in Belgium was entitled access to higher education on the same basis 
as nationals (Bellamy et al. 2006: 10). The ECJ reasoned that common vocational 
training was indispensable to free movement of persons and that imposing a fee on 
students from other Member States that was not imposed on domestic students 
discriminated on the grounds of nationality, contrary to the non-discrimination principle 
(Maas 2007: 36). Although there is a residual economic criterion for the right of free 
movement to exist, it has, thus, been defined in such a way as to be almost meaningless. 
In fact, the ECJ has deliberately and progressively elaborated a right of free movement 
akin to a citizenship right. (Downes 2001: 98.) 
 
Taken together, the legal principles of the right free movement and non-discrimination 
led commentators to suggest that there already existed a concept of citizenship under 
European Community law, though these rights were mainly oriented around the free 
movement provisions (Bellamy et al. 2006: 10) and promenaded under another name 
altogether such as worker mobility, the single market, institutional reform and so on 
(Jenson 2007: 58). Citizens of one Member State who moved to another one to take up 
residence or employment were, thus, caught up in the creation of European rights 
because they were the beneficiaries of free movement, practiced it, and pushed for its 
expansion (Maas 2007: 5). Just as in national stories of citizenship, rights were often 
first targeted and guaranteed over time to particular categories of the population before 
boundaries were extended to all (Jenson 2007: 58). 
 
                                                          
3 ) Case C-186/87 Ian William Cowan v. Le Trésor public [1989] ECR 195.  
4 ) Case 293/83 Françoise Gravier v. City of Liège [1985] ECR 593. 
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The introduction of a legal conception of citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty also soon 
influenced the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (Smismans 2009: 61). In 
Martinez Sala5, the Court held that a Spanish national who had long-term residence in 
Germany could rely upon the non-discrimination principle on grounds of nationality as 
the basis for claiming access on the same basis as German nationals to a German child-
raising benefit for her new born child (Maas 2997: 64). This was an interesting 
extension of previous case-law, as Martinez Sala herself was not an economic migrant 
(Besson & Utzinger 2008: 192) and, therefore, was not traditionally protected by the 
scope of EU law (Bellamy et al. 2006: 14). Thus, the decision offered a tantalising 
prospect of EU citizenship as the source of wide-ranging social rights which are not 
directly linked to economic activity (Downes 2001: 101). 
 
There have been further incremental extensions of the protection of the access of EU 
citizens to various social benefits, even where they are economically inactive. In the 
case Grzelzcyk6 in 2001, the ECJ held that a French national studying at a Belgian 
University was entitled to a minimum subsistence benefit on the same basis as 
nationals, when he found himself unable to work part time alongside studying in the 
final year of his course. (Bellamy et al. 2006: 14.) He was protected by the principle of 
non-discrimination on ground of nationality as well as the provisions on citizenship 
which protected his rights to move and reside freely in another Member State (Besson 
& Utzinger 2008: 192). Interestingly in Grzelczyk the ECJ also engaged in a verbal 
flourish which has been repeated since that time on numerous occasions in its case law 
(Bellamy et al. 2006: 14): 
 
“Union Citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy 
the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject only to 
exceptions as are expressly provided for.” (ECJ 2001: I-6242) 
 
The critical ideal that underpins EU citizenship is, thus, the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality since it means that EU citizens are entitled to 
                                                          
5 ) Case C-85/96 Maria Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691 
6 ) Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies –Louvian-la-Neuve [2001] 
ECR I-6193.  
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equal treatment with nationals of the chosen Member State of residence (Kostakopoulou 
2013: 9). The ECJ continues to play a major role in the enhancement and extension of 
rights related to EU citizenship by gradually extending the principle of equal treatment 
in the access to social benefits to economically inactive categories such as students, 
children, and those unable to work, based on the already mentioned principles of non-
discrimination and freedom of movement. Its power is grounded in the doctrines of 
supremacy (primacy of European norms over national laws and practices) and direct 
effect (the rights conferred to individuals by European rules can be directly applied and 
even applied against governments in national courts). (Moro 2012: 42−43.) 
 
Overall it is important to understand that the process of negative integration, that is, the 
removal of obstacles to free trade across internal borders within the Community, guided 
the first steps towards the construction of European citizenship. It, furthermore, set the 
framework for positive integration which focused on more explicit policy steps towards 
creating rights for European citizens (Wiener 2003: 406). In 1989, the Single European 
Act (SEA) came into force as the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome. Despite the 
Member States’ commitment to a common market, the Europeanisation of social policy 
remained controversial and national governments seemed unwilling to give the 
Community a broader role in this field. However, one important exception was made 
with Article 118a on the minimum harmonization concerning health and safety of 
workers, which allowed directives to be agreed on the basis of a qualified majority in 
the Council as opposed to unanimity. The provisions adopted following this Article 
were minimum regulations only but, nevertheless, under this provision reluctant 
Member States could be forced to align their social legislation with the majority of 
Member States, even against their will. (Falkner 2003: 266.) 
 
The Maastricht Treaty introduced new social policy provisions that constituted an 
extension of Community competence into a wide area of social policy issues, including 
working conditions, the information and consultation of workers, equality between men 
and women with regard to labour market opportunities and equal treatment at work (as 
opposed to equal pay that was already introduced in the Treaty of Rome), and the 
integration of persons excluded from the labour market. Some issues were, however, 
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explicitly excluded from the scope of harmonization under the Maastricht social policy 
provisions, namely pay, the right of association, the right to strike, and the right to 
impose lock-outs. (Falkner 2013: 171.) Additionally, qualified majority voting was 
extended to more issue areas than before although unanimous decisions remained for 
social security matters and the social protection of workers, the protection of workers 
whose employment contract is terminated, representation and collective defence of 
interests of workers and employers, conditions of employment for third-country 
nationals, and financial contributions for promotion of employment and job creation. 
(Falkner 2003 267−268.) 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam excluded further harmonization of domestic laws but 
provided for the coordination of national employment policies on the basis of annual 
guidelines and national follow-up reports. Furthermore, a new Article 13 on Community 
action against discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, ethnic origin, belief, disability, 
age, and sexual orientation was inserted. (Falkner 2003: 269.) The Nice Treaty of 2001 
was also not particularly innovative in terms of social policy matter but it allowed that 
measures (not legislation) to improve transnational cooperation can now be adopted on 
all social issues, not only those concerning social exclusion and equal opportunities, as 
was the case after Amsterdam. Under the Lisbon Treaty, social security provisions for 
migrant workers are the only new issues to fall within qualified majority voting in the 
Council. Although the Nice and Lisbon Treaties only changed a few aspects of EU 
social policy, it is clear that formal competences have been extended over time to a very 
significant extent. (Falkner 2013: 272.) 
 
A catalogue of social rights were developed for the Charter of Fundamental rights 
(Jenson2007: 60), which formally came under the Treaty framework in the Lisbon 
Treaty and hence acquired a higher legal status. It is the first single document that 
codifies all the rights of European citizens previously found in a variety of legislative 
instruments, such as national laws and the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It was drawn up by a convention and was 
formally adopted in Nice in December 2000. The Lisbon Treaty gives the Charter 
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binding effect, conferring on it the same legal value as the treaties7. (Falkner 2013: 
272.) The preamble of the Charter states that “the Union is founded on the indivisible, 
universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity; it is based on the 
principles of democracy and the rule of law” (European Union 2012: 326). The 
provisions of the Charter are addressed directly to the institutions of the European 
Union with regard to the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when 
they are implementing Union law (Falkner 2013: 272). 
 
Although EU citizenship remains in principle derivative and based on being a national 
citizen of a Member State, it has triggered a shift from nationality to residence as a 
criterion for the acquisition of certain national citizenship rights (Besson & Utzinger 
2008: 194−195). European citizens are now entitled to equal access to employment in 
the public and private sectors, equal treatment with respect to conditions of 
employment, including remuneration and dismissal as well as the same social and tax 
advantages that national citizens receive and educational opportunities (Kostakopoulou 
2013: 9). Furthermore, after five years of continuous residence in the host Member 
State, EU citizens become permanent citizens entitled to enjoy complete equal treatment 
with national citizens (Article 17 of Directive 2004/38). 
 
Free movement and equal treatment (civil rights), political rights and social protection 
(social rights) are all important for the development of the adequate institutional 
functioning of European citizenship (Kostakopoulou 2013: 9). However, to allow EU 
level rights to impact upon Member State rights undermines national citizenship 
(Bellamy 2008: 606−607). The erosion of national citizenship under the influence of EU 
citizenship may already be observed at two levels at least. First of all, as regards the 
granting and withdrawal of national citizenship, there is now more than one authority 
granting rights to national citizens; citizenship rights in Europe are, thus, fragmented. 
As a result, national governments no longer hold absolute sovereignty over the rights 
and duties of their citizens. Second, Member States also face challenges with respect to 
the enforcement of national citizenship rights as they have to grant non-nationals the 
rights previously exclusively granted to national citizens. Moreover, EU citizens see 
                                                          
7 ) Poland and the UK negotiated an opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Falkner 2013: 272)  
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some of their rights as protected by the EU as well, when it is vested with 
implementation competences. (Besson & Utzinger 2008: 194−195.) 
 
According to Bellamy (2008b: 606−607), the erosion of national citizenship is 
problematic since rights do not constitute citizenship; rather, citizenship constitutes 
rights by allowing citizens to determine the public goods on which their rights depend 
on an equitable basis. The different rights regimes of the Member States reflect the 
ways that the various peoples of Europe have exercise their most basic right as citizens, 
namely as participants in the collective decision-making process that determine their 
rights. Since the EU lacks a general European public sphere, this “right of rights” is not 
yet operative at the European level. (ibid.) As a result, the EU is ill-suited to act as the 
primary agent in the establishment of European social rights. In other words, it lacks the 
legitimacy, which would be necessary to secure the support for extensive redistribution. 
(Newman 1996: 100.) For EU rights to be genuine rights of citizenship, European 
citizens would, thus, need to have a say in defining their rights (Bellamy 2008b: 607).  
 
3.3.2. The political dimension 
 
During the past few years, the European Commission has become increasingly active in 
the field of citizens participation (Fischer-Holzer 2010: 335) and the European Union’s 
citizenship model has progressively shifted beyond the liberal conception of citizenship 
(Kostakopoulou 201311) as a formal, legal right-bearing status (Smismans 2009: 60). 
According to Moro (2012: 46−47), the participatory dimension of European citizenship 
is articulated at two levels: 1) participation in the establishment of EU representative 
institutions; and 2) the programmes and initiative promoted by the Commission (Moro 
2012: 46−47). These two levels are not distinct from one another, but can both be 
viewed as responses to the growing concern about a lack of citizen involvement in the 
project of European integration as well as concerns about the democratic deficit. 
 
Participation in the establishment of EU representative institutions can be either direct 
or indirect (Moro 2012: 46). According to Nentwich (1996: 3), indirect opportunity 
structures for participation requires some form of mediator within the political system, 
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generally a group of politicians, before the input can be translated into political action. 
By contrast, direct opportunity structures have a non-mediated effect on the political 
system (ibid.).The direct type of participation mainly concerns the right to vote in and 
stand as a candidate in European parliamentary elections (Smismans 2009: 61) while 
the indirect type consists of the representation of the executives elected by citizens or by 
national parliaments in the European Council, the Council of the European Union and in 
other institutions and bodies of the EU. It is also possible to add the European citizen 
right to take part in the municipal elections in the Member State of residence to these 
forms of participation. (Moro 2012: 47.) 
 
The establishment of direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) in 1979 was 
arguably the first major shift towards a more participatory politics in the EU (Monaghan 
2012: 289). Furthermore, from the perspective of representative democracy, the EP has 
undergone a noteworthy development since the end of the 1970s, not only in its internal 
organisation, (Conrad 2011: 12) but most importantly, treaty amendments and 
institutional agreements have granted the EP considerable greater powers (Scully 2003: 
168) in relation to the EU’s two other legislative institutions, most of all the Council but 
also in relation to the European Commission. These developments have taken place as a 
more or less incremental process, stretching from the first direct election to the 
European Parliament all the way to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 
December 2009. (Conrad 2011: 12.) 
 
Until 1979, members of the European Assembly, as it was called until 1986, were 
primarily members of their respective national parliaments (Connolly, Day & Shaw 
2006: 34). The European Assembly also played a rather weak role in relation to the 
Commission and the Council, reflecting the strong intergovernmental imprint in 
decision-making at the European level at the time (Conrad 2011: 12). The so-called 
consultation procedure was the only legislative procedure at the time meaning that the 
European Assembly could only offer its opinion, but could not force the Commission or 
the Council to respond to this opinion. As a result, the European Assembly was merely 
a consultative body with no formal mechanism of influencing legislation. (Scully 2003: 
170.) However, the role of the EP and, thereby, European-level representative 
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democracy was strengthened in a series of treaty changes in the mid-1980s (Conrad 
2011: 12). The Single European Act introduced the so-called cooperation procedure for 
legislation related to the Single Market. This permitted the EP to propose amendments 
or issue a veto that could only be overturned by a unanimous Council, although the 
consultation procedure was retained for most laws. (Scully 2003: 170.) While this was a 
disappointment to those who wanted to see a more decisive strengthening of the EP, the 
cooperation procedure, nonetheless, prepared the ground for the introduction of the co-
decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty (Conrad 2011: 12). 
 
In the Maastricht Treaty, the co-decision procedure was then introduced. In areas where 
the co-decision procedure applied, the Council and the European Parliament both had to 
give their consent to proposals made by the European Commission. (Conrad 2011: 
12−13.) However, in the Maastricht Treaty, the number of areas in which co-decision 
applied was still rather limited since only around one-quarter of laws were processed 
under this procedure. The co-decision procedure was revised in the Amsterdam Treaty 
and extended to further areas of EU law (Scully 2003: 170). The number of areas in 
which co-decision applies was also extended in the Treaty of Nice entering into force in 
2003 as well as in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 (Conrad 2011: 12), where it was also 
renamed as the ordinary legislative procedure (Burns 2013: 163). 
 
Where the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) applies, the Council cannot under any 
circumstances go against the position of the European Parliament as it could under the 
consultation procedure and even under the cooperation procedure. In order for 
legislation to be adopted, the Council and the EP have to agree or find a mutually 
acceptable compromise; otherwise, the Commission’s proposal is rejected. (Conrad 
2011: 12−13.) Initially, the OLP applied to only fifteen treaty Articles, but its scope has 
been extended to cover eighty-five policy areas making the EP a genuine co-legislator 
with the Council (Burns 2013: 163). From the perspective of representative democracy, 
it is therefore important to note that co-decision gives equal weight to the 
representatives of the European citizens and to the representatives of the European 
governments (Conrad 2011: 12−13). 
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The dominant approach to democratic legitimacy in the EU is that a parliamentarization 
of decision-making at the European level is an important part of the solution to the 
democratic deficit. The reason why it is considered such an important remedy is that 
parliaments provide a crucial linkage between citizens and government or, at the 
European level, between citizens and the Commission as well as the Council. (Andeweg 
2007: 102.) However, while the EP may be increasingly important as a policy-shaping 
tool, it falls short in many respects as a representative one (Scully 2003: 176−177). In 
particular, it lacks a common public sphere in which competition among political elites 
and elections for government could take place and where agenda-setting could take 
place and be recognised (Greven 2000: 54−55). Furthermore, elections for the EP have 
witnessed levels of turnout generally lower than those obtained in the national 
parliamentary elections and, despite its growing powers, voter turnout has fallen to 
below 50 per cent of the eligible voters (Scully 2003: 176−177). Expanding the model 
of representative democracy is, therefore, not likely to be adequate to legitimise 
European decision-making (Greven 2000: 55). 
 
Voting at the national level might also be considered as an act of participation in the 
European Union since national elections influence the composition of two central EU 
institutions, namely the Council of the European Union and the European Council 
(Nentwich 1996: 4). Indeed, according to Young (1995: 4), the most important channel 
by which public opinion impacts on EU policy-making is via national governments. 
Andeweg (2007: 102) also emphasises the role of the national parliaments as the most 
important mechanisms linking the citizens to the EU.  Furthermore, national voting is a 
control mechanism in the sense that a strong political mandate at the national level may 
induce a government to hold a particular view on a European issue with the 
consequence of vetoing decisions in the Council or of filling complaints to the European 
Court of Justice. Voting at the national level can, therefore, be considered as an indirect 
opportunity structure for participation in European decision-making. (Nentwich 1998: 
4.) 
 
The right to petition the European Parliament can also be included among the forms of 
participation that concerns representation (Smismans 2009: 61). European citizens can 
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turn to their elected representatives to suggest improvements or changes that might 
address existing problems. Such problems could include perceived violations of 
citizens’ individual rights in their respective member states. Petitions frequently also 
aim at showing that new laws are necessary. (Conrad 2011: 13.) An important 
difference from the European Citizens’ Initiative is that a petition can be submitted by 
one citizen acting alone and is restricted to matters which affect him or her directly 
(Nentwich 1996: 5). The European Parliament is, however, not obliged to act on any 
given petition (Conrad 2011: 13). Petitions are an indirect opportunity structure for 
participation, particularly in the European context, and, as long as the role of the EP is 
not that of primary legislative chamber, any citizen’s influence via this body remains 
limited. Nonetheless, the EP frequently forwards petitions to the Commission 
sometimes leading to changes in national legislation. (Nentwich 1996: 5.) 
 
European citizens also have the possibility of directing a complaint to the European 
ombudsman (Nentwich 1996: 6). To some extent, this right opens up the participatory 
dimension towards interaction with the administration, yet being an ex-post control on 
maladministration of EU institutions and bodies, this can hardly be called a particularly 
strong conceptualisation of participation in European decision-making (Smismans 2009: 
61). Even if the ombudsman’s investigation determines that maladministration has taken 
place or is taking place, the office’s ultimate instrument is to submit a report to the 
European Parliament (Conrad 2011: 13−14). The role of the Ombudsman as an 
opportunity structure for political participation is, thus, rather limited (Nentwich 1996: 
5). 
 
In addition to the above mentioned opportunity structures for participation, the EU has 
developed a range of participatory features related to representative democracy 
(Monaghan 2012: 290). These include hearings and conferences organised by the 
European Parliament and direct contacts with the members of the EP (Nentwich 1996: 
5). In quantitative terms, therefore, participation has become more prominent in the EU. 
However, the nature, quality and effectiveness of these participation opportunities are 
questionable. (Monaghan 2012: 290.) What is lacking is, therefore, a far broader 
conceptualisation in which participation in a multi-level polity, through different levels 
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of government and modes of governance, would aim at the citizenship ideal of self-
governance (Smismans 2009: 61). 
 
In recent years, genuine efforts have been made by the European Commission to 
institutionalise more direct forms of political participation and a complex constellation 
of political links among the citizens, civil society organisations, and the European 
Union institutions (Kostakopoulou 2013: 11−12). In the 2001 White Paper on 
Governance, the Commission identifies participation as a principle of good governance 
and it is stated that “the quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on 
ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain – from conception to 
implementation” (Commission 2001: 10). However, the Commission connects its 
democratising aspirations solely and explicitly with associational involvement and 
direct citizen participation in European affairs is not proposed as a solution to the 
democratic deficit (Hüller 2010: 79−80). Instead, citizen participation was merely 
discussed under the headline “Reaching out to citizens through regional and local 
democracy” (Commission 2001: 12); citizens were only to be given a voice via civil 
society (Fischer-Hotzel 2010: 340). 
 
In light of public rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch 
referenda in 2005 (Monaghan 2012: 289), the Commission did not just have to 
acknowledge vital resistance to certain aspects of European integration. A core aspect of 
the Commission’s legitimisation strategy for the EU, highlighted in the White Paper, 
also proved to be unsuccessful, namely, the idea to improve the democratic quality of 
political processes, and, thus, their acceptance, via civil society involvement. (Hüller 
2010: 81.) The Convention method8 used to draft the Constitutional Treaty was heavily 
influenced by ideas of associational involvement, but the Treaty clearly still failed to 
capture the hearts of European citizens (Smismans 2009: 62). As a result, the 
                                                          
8 ) The Convention method was used for the first time to draft the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU. Instead of the traditional diplomatic bargaining that normally characterizes the EU, the text was 
drafted in a Convention composed of representatives of the Heads of Government, of the national 
parliaments, and of the EP, in addition to two representatives from the Commission. The process was 
broadened by including civil society representatives from the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the social partners as well as by organising online an extensive consultation process with civil 
society. This method was subsequently applied to the drafting process of the Constitutional Treaty. 
(Smismans 2009: 62.) 
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Commission brought about a more participatory strategy of “bringing in the citizens 
directly” (Hüller 2010: 81). This shift from civil society organisations to ordinary 
citizens is visible in the Commission’s Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate 
and in the Europe for Citizens Programme 2007−2013 (Fischer-Hotzel 2010: 341). 
 
The Europe for Citizens Programme 2007-2013 put forward a new approach to citizen 
involvement (Hüller 2010: 81). Its general objectives comprised “giving citizens the 
opportunity to interact and participate in constructing an ever closer Europe”, 
“developing a sense of European identity”, “fostering a sense of ownership of the 
European Union among its citizens” and “enhancing tolerance and mutual 
understanding between European citizens” (Commission 2007: 6). A similar approach 
can be found in the Commissions’ Plan-D, which was supposed to be “a long-term plan 
to re-invigorate European democracy and help the emergence of a European public 
sphere, where citizens are given the information and the tools to actively participate in 
the decision-making process and gain ownership of the European project” 
(Commission 2005: 2−3).  
 
Although the Commission claimed that Plan-D was not a rescue operation for the 
Constitutional Treaty, the programme was adopted explicitly in response to the 
Council’s request to introduce a period of reflection (Smismans 2009: 63). Plan-D was 
seen as “an exercise for listening and dialogue. The ultimate objective of the 
Commission is to be able to draw lessons from the concerns expressed by the citizens” 
(Commission 2005: 10). Thus, it appears that the purpose of the Commission’s 
programmes is to foster democratisation of the EU and legitimacy (Hüller 2010: 82) by 
creating a citizens’ debate on European issues (Smismans 2009: 63). 
 
As a result, various new forms and instruments of direct citizen participation have been 
established at the European level. Hüller (2010: 82) identifies five instruments that are 
expected to have democratising functions as well as allows for direct citizen 
participation: the deliberative opinion polls “Tomorrow’s Europe” and Europolis, the 
European Citizens’ Consultations, the Commission’s online consultations, the European 
Citizens’ Initiative, as well as national referenda with regard to major political 
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developments. These instruments differ sharply since some of them are integral parts of 
the EU’s political system, such as the Commission’s Online Consultations, while others 
are rather external participatory projects organised by civil society actors, such as the 
deliberative polls and the Citizens’ Consultations. Furthermore, it is noticeable that 
most of these instruments are policy-oriented measures; besides EP elections, it is only 
referenda and the Europolis, which aims to authorise the European political elite. Given 
the democratic deficit, the dominant orientation towards policy-related instruments is, at 
least, questionable. (ibid. 82−83.) 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned instruments, there are some opportunity structures 
for citizen participation that exist independently of any specific programme (Fischer-
Hotzel 2010: 342). These include informal exchanges, such as blogs of Commission 
officials, chats and various forms of letter writing. However, despite their obvious 
purpose of providing for personal contacts between the citizens and the Commission 
(Nentwich 1998: 129), these opportunities do not involve an element of direct citizen 
participation since their main purpose is simply to increase transparency in the 
European Union rather than granting citizens the opportunity to influence European 
decision-makers (Fischer-Hotzel 2010: 342). 
 
The EU has become increasingly participatory by developing multiple opportunities for 
participation (Monaghan 2012: 286). However, Nentwich (1998) has noted that many of 
the opportunities for citizen participation in the EU are indirect, non-binding and 
informal. Apart from European elections every five years, and, on occasions, referenda, 
there are no possibilities for direct citizen participation. (ibid. 12.) Instead, the 
commitment to participation is more apparent in discursive terms than practical terms 
where participation is often used in the context of consultation with organised interests 
while opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in European decision-making 
tend to be rather limited. In this light, the European Citizens’ Initiative is an important 
innovation in providing citizens with the opportunity to influence the initiation of the 
EU legislative process despite its obvious limitations. (Conrad 2011: 14.)  
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3.3.3. The collective dimension 
 
Peters (2005: 226) distinguishes between ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ identities. Deep identities 
are characterised by intense commitment or solidarities and by a long time-horizon, rich 
collective memories and felt collective aspirations for the future. Shallow identities, on 
the other hand, are based on a narrow range of common interests or concerns, low 
solidarity and short time horizons. (ibid.) In a similar vein, Kantner (2006: 509ff.) 
distinguishes between particularistic communities, whose members share a weak sense 
of identity – a commercium – and other communities, whose members share a strong 
sense of identity, the so-called communio. It is conceivable that the deep collective 
identities shared by members of a communio might be a preferable basis for a political 
order (Peters 2005: 226) since it is considered to provide a communitarian fundament 
for bridging deep conflict; shared values provide a common evaluative ground so that 
some conflicts do not occur (Kantner 2006: 506). In this paper, the distinction between 
commercium and communio will be applied in order to analyse whether European 
citizens share ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ feelings of collective identity. 
 
Members of a commercium are merely aware of being involved in a cooperative 
enterprise (Biegon 2010: 5). The affiliation within a community in this minimalistic 
sense consists of an awareness by the individual participants of being, willingly or not, 
part of the ‘game’. The members of such a community only share a collective identity in 
the weak sense of a shared interpretation of their situation, however, that does not 
include common ethical convictions: everybody still follow their own desires and 
interests. A commercium is, therefore, not a common, ethically motivated project that 
the members participate in. The members see the community rather as a club or 
neighbourhood. (Kantner 2006: 511.)  Such a particularistic European community 
emerges when European citizens experience in numerous spheres of life that the 
relevant economic, legal and political space is no longer exclusively the nation-state, 
and decide that certain purposes can better be achieved by cooperating with each other 
(Biegon 2010: 5). 
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The members of a communio, on the other hand, share values regarding a distinct 
common enterprise and certain conceptions of what counts for them as a ‘good life’. In 
the light of their conception of a ‘good life’, they interpret their past and continue their 
traditions. Only collective identities in the ‘strong’ sense consist of the widely shared 
ethical self-understanding of the individual members of a communio. (Kantner 2006: 
513.) This shared ethical self-understanding does, however, not necessarily refer to a 
common cultural heritage, traditions and memories. The crucial point is that members 
of a community discursively agree upon what counts for them as ‘good life’; a 
collective self-understanding can, therefore, also be based on commonly shared 
perceptions of the future (Biegon 2010: 5.): people might come together and create new 
communio groups in order to pursue a common ethical project (Kantner 2006: 513). 
Nonetheless, the communio resembles the communitarian conceptualisation of 
community. A European identity in this ‘strong’ sense emerges when citizens begin to 
share collective preferences and do no longer solely act according to their interests and 
preferences (Biegon 2010: 5). 
 
In recent years, an impressive body of literature has emerged in which the theoretical 
debate on European identity is substantiated by empirical studies. The empirical 
research is roughly divided between two groups: empirical studies focus on people’s 
attitudes towards and their identification with Europe by relying on data generated in 
mass surveys; and discourse analysis focus on the discursively construction of European 
identity. Both approaches have generated valuable empirical data, however, the two 
methodological approaches rely on different understandings of the concept of identity. 
(Biegon 2010: 6.) Public opinion surveys conducted by Eurobarometer are part of a 
wider range of survey items that have at various times included different dimensions of 
support for European unification and approval of the EU (Kohli 2000: 122). They offer 
a richness of data about collective identity as experienced and expressed by the 
individual citizens, which can be used for secondary analysis of European identity. 
However, studies relying on opinion data take identities as something given, as 
something comparatively static that people simply have, neglecting the struggles and 
tensions that accompany collective identity formation processes. (Biegon 2010: 6−7.) 
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An entirely different methodological approach for studying European identities is 
constituted by discourse analysis, which does not take collective identities as given but 
considers them to be discursively constructed. When discourse analysts engage in 
examining European identities, they attempt to investigate the systems of meaning that 
form the identity of political entities such as the EU. Discourse analysis is context-
sensitive as it follows the premise that there is no such thing as one European identity. 
However, most empirical studies investigating European identity constructions focus on 
political elites’ discourses following the assumption that political elites play a pivotal 
role in the discursive construction of political identities. (Biegon 2010: 7−8) Since this 
paper is interested in examining the ‘thickness’ of European identity from the 
perspective of European citizenship, it is necessary to rely on public opinion research in 
which citizens’ attitudes are the main focus of interest. If the European Citizens’ 
Initiative is to be an instrument for the democratisation of the EU, it is less important 
how the European elite construct European identity since the ECI is intended to be used 
by ‘ordinary’ European citizens. 
 
In order to find out whether European citizens are a commercium, it is necessary to try 
to access Europeans’ views about themselves as Europeans. It appears that ‘weak’ 
European identities in the sense of a commercium have already developed. This can be 
demonstrated on the basis of the opinions of European citizens on European politics. 
(Kantner 2006: 511.) Eurobarometer findings indicate that 41 percent of Europeans 
believe that they benefit from membership of the European Union with the reduction of 
border controls being the EU achievement from which Europeans are most likely to say 
that they have benefitted (European Commission 2013a: 17). European citizens are, 
furthermore, aware of the fact that they are members of the national political community 
as well as the European (Kantner 2006: 511): 49 percent of European citizens see 
themselves as members of both (European Commission 2013a: 26). The European 
institutions are quite well known even if their relative importance is not always properly 
understood (Kantner 2006: 511). The European Parliament is the most well-known 
European institution with a majority of 90 percent of European citizens stating that they 
have heard of it. The European Commission (84 percent) and the European Court of 
Justice (83 percent) are also relatively well-known, while the Council of the European 
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Union (69 percent) is the least known European institution. (European Commission 
2013b: 91.)  Only about 51 percent of European citizens, however, agree that they 
understand how the EU works (ibid. 114). 
 
Nonetheless, “if the EU was scrapped” (European Commission 2004: 86), indifference 
and regrets would be mixed. European citizens do not necessarily love the EU. An 
overwhelming majority, however, considers the EU a reasonable thing (Kantner 2006: 
512) and would even be ready to grant it more decision authority in a number of areas 
such as ‘the fight against terrorism’ (81 percent) and ‘promotion of democracy and 
peace in the world’ (81 percent), but also in areas traditionally associated with the 
nation-state such as ‘protecting social rights’ (64 percent) and ‘fighting unemployment’ 
(60 percent) (European Commission 2009: 148). Furthermore, a majority of Europeans 
support a common defence and security policy (74 percent) as well as a common 
foreign policy (64 percent) (European Commission 2013b: 119). The experience of 
living in a common legal space and having a common market, thus, seems to lead in the 
long run to the shared belief of being a member of a particularistic group. This 
phenomenon is well-known and documented also from the study of elites, such as EU 
officials, who work very much exposed to European institutions. (Kantner 2006: 512.) 
 
Europeans seem to be quite convinced that, with regard to a growing number of issues, 
they will cooperate with each other in order to achieve those purposes (Kantner 2006: 
512). The EU has been seen as the actor best able to take effective actions against the 
effects of the financial and economic crisis since 2009, although closely followed by the 
national government (European Commission 2013c: 15). In fact, nine in ten Europeans 
would like to see more cooperation between the European Union Member States in 
order to tackle the economic and financial crisis (ibid. 21). It, thus appears, that 
Europeans share the view that if one is unavoidably in the same boat as others, one had 
better decide democratically about the rules of coexistence, at least for the duration of 
the journey (Kantner 2006: 512). 
 
In everyday life, political communities generally resemble a commercium: ‘egoistic’ 
interests are negotiated against each other, mutual obligations are established, and 
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contracts are signed and later fulfilled, but the participants primarily follow their own 
purposes without orientations towards any common interest (Kantner 2006: 512−513). 
The affiliation within a community in this minimalistic sense consists of an awareness 
by the individual participants of being part of the ‘game’ and perhaps also equipped 
with certain rights within an institutionalised setting (Biegon 2010: 5). However, for the 
establishment of a far-reaching collective project such as the EU, a weak collective 
identity in the sense of a commercium might not be sufficient. By no means, though, is 
every public debate an identity discourse that contributes to the clarity of ethical self-
understanding of the citizenry, as the communitarian position would suggest. Only in 
the face of extraordinary problems or conflicts is there a challenge to the shared self-
understanding. In such situations the political community has to prove itself as a value-
integrated communio. (Kantner 2006: 512−513.) 
 
Do European citizens share some sort of ethical self-understanding reflecting a 
collective identity in the strong sense of a communio? According to the Eurobarometer, 
a quite stable minority of 10 percent of European citizens rate their European identity 
higher than their national identity or claim to see themselves as Europeans only 
(European Commission 2013a: 26). However, this might be properly interpreted as a 
political statement of deliberate political identification with Europe (Kantner 2006: 
513−514). The aforementioned fact notwithstanding, almost half of all European 
respondents (49 percent) currently see themselves first as members of their nation and 
then as Europeans and 38 percent define themselves solely by their nationality 
(European Commission 2013a: 26), which may rather indicate a commercium-like 
European identity. Nevertheless, a majority of 68 percent are proud to be European 
(European Commission 2004: 99), and 46 percent feel attached to the EU. Attachment 
to the EU has, however, deteriorated since 2010 where 53 percent of Europeans stated 
that they felt very or fairly attached. In comparison, a very large majority of Europeans 
are attached to their country (91 percent). (European Commission 2012: 7.) 
 
Asking for identity in such a general way turns interpretation into a rather problematic 
undertaking since it does not take into account whether European citizens share basic 
convictions of what they think is the right way to live together. More detailed 
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information on the ethical self-understanding of Europeans would have to be obtained 
from issue-related data. (Kantner 2006: 513−514.) Nonetheless, Eurobarometer surveys 
demonstrate that the sense of belonging to the EU lags far behind that of belonging to 
one’s nation-state (Kohli 2000: 126). The EU is valued primarily for its importance in 
reinforcing national status and the benefits it offers to the Member States. While a 
majority of European citizens support membership of the EU, such backing appears to 
be lukewarm and fragile with only a small minority strongly committed to efforts to 
unify Europe (Bellamy 2006: 248). A ‘thick’ sense of collective identity based on 
shared cultural and moral values is, thus, absent at the European level (Etzioni 2007). 
 
Some authors (Fossum 2008; Habermas 1996) argue that a European identity could be 
built on constitutional patriotism instead of a communitarian sense of identity. 
Constitutional patriotism refers to a mode of attachment wherein citizens are bound 
together by a subscription to democratic values and human rights, rather than through 
the traditional pre-political ties that communitarians appeal to. This type of identity is 
conducive to respect for and accommodation of difference and plurality. (Fossum 2008: 
138−140.) Constitutional patriots see rights as potentially replacing belonging as a 
source of social solidarity within the EU. It is the just political culture of the state that 
binds citizens to it, rather than nationality or some other social, religious or ethnic 
cultural force (Bellamy 2008b: 604). Instead, citizens identify with the polity because of 
a constitutional patriotism stemming from the justice of its regime (Bellamy & 
Castiglione 2008: 170). 
 
What makes such a regime just is its embodiment of the rights that establish the 
conditions of private and public autonomy necessary for free and equal participation in 
democratic decision-making. As a result, citizens can identify with the legal system of 
rights as theirs because it enables a process of democratic deliberation on their 
collective policies. (Bellamy 2008b: 604.) Constitutional patriotism is a post-national 
identity (Fossum 2008: 140) and it decries the particularism inherent in the 
communitarian view of citizen practices and attachments and declares it unfit for the 
realities of modern politics (Habermas 1996: 505). 
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Constitutional patriotism points to a notion of citizenship that favours a status-based 
conception since it is grounded in a rights-based conceptualisation and its primary aim 
is to serve individual autonomy, not build and maintain rich notions of community such 
as advocated by communitarians. Instead, rights become the primary characteristics of 
citizenship in the public sphere as citizens attempt to deliberate on a common future and 
an individual’s particularistic characteristics must be bracketed off if they are based on 
pre-political sources. (Maynor 2008: 195.) A consensus on rights is both the end point 
and the presupposition or rationale of democratic deliberation. However, the difficulty 
with this thesis is that there is considerable disagreement about the foundations and 
character of rights since European citizens have already elaborated contrasting rights-
cultures within their nation-states. (Bellamy 2008b: 604−605.) By trying to extract any 
pre-political notions from their conception of citizenship, constitutional patriots are, 
therefore, in danger of leaning too far towards a strict, status-based conception of 
citizenship that cannot be maintained because it contains an overly ‘thin’ account of 
political identity based around rights. The result is an impoverished conception of 
citizenship that fails to bind people together into a community. (Maynor 2008: 194.)  
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4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The European Union increasingly shapes the lives, circumstances and aspirations of 
Europeans. While the EU has acquired substantial powers, its decision-making 
processes have, however, largely been insulated from popular influence. This means 
that decisions are increasingly taken at the European level without providing the 
necessary opportunities for citizens to participate in public deliberation and decision-
making. This paper has, therefore, argued that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit 
and the more power that the EU gets, the more pronounced this deficit becomes. At the 
same time, it is possible to see the EU as a rescue of the nation-state since it affords the 
nation-states more control over policies than if they were attempting to operate alone in 
a world that is becoming increasingly globalised. Nevertheless, the democratic deficit 
cannot simply be traded off against the benefits that the EU brings since these very 
benefits have not been subjected to public debate. As a result, they may fail to respond 
to the relevant concerns of European citizens. It has, thus, become pressingly relevant to 
discuss how it is possible to facilitate the emergence of a European public sphere. 
 
As a response to the growing concern about the democratic deficit in the European 
Union, the European Citizens’ Initiative was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty. The ECI 
provides European citizens with an opportunity structure for direct political 
participation, although it does not introduce an element of direct democracy, i.e., 
collective decisions are not made directly by European citizens. Nonetheless, it 
establishes a direct and formally institutionalised channel between European citizens 
and the European Commission giving European citizens an agenda-setting role in the 
legislative process by allowing at least one million European citizens to invite the 
European Commission to submit a legislative proposal within the framework of the 
legislative powers attributed to the EU. Through its implicit appeal to a European 
political space beyond national borders, the ECI essentially encourages European 
citizens to discuss European issues of common concern. In this sense, the ECI has the 
potential to create a common political space in Europe. 
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According to the normative model of democracy proposed in this paper, citizenship is 
both the constitutive element and a prerequisite of a democratic public sphere. A 
functioning democratic public sphere at the European level, therefore, presupposes 
European citizens equipped with civil, political and social rights, opportunities to 
participate in European decision-making and a European collective identity.  Although, 
it is questionable whether the proposed model can be applied to a European framework, 
this paper has argued that it is possible based on the assumption that the democratic 
deficit is the result of a citizenship deficit rather than the result of weaknesses in 
normative political theory. In the light of this perspective on democratic legitimacy, the 
paper has evaluated the ECI as part of the concept of European citizenship. The paper 
has argued that if the ECI is to be a catalyst for a democratisation of the EU, it is 
necessary that it contributes to a more adequate model of European citizenship. The 
ECI, thus, needs to address a citizenship deficit for it to be a solution to the democratic 
deficit in the EU. 
 
The assessment of European citizenship carried out in this research found that European 
citizenship is mainly the derivative of national citizenship. Instead of signalling the 
provision of a distinct set of rights by the EU, the rights conferred by EU citizenship 
have almost exclusively been confined to the right to freedom of movement, which 
means that almost all EU citizenship rights are contingent on residence in another 
Member State. European citizens, therefore, mainly acquire their civil, political and 
social rights from their respective nation-states, e.g., the EU is not the provider of social 
rights but enables European citizens to gain access to social benefits in the Member 
State of residence. As a result, EU citizenship would appear to represent a descent down 
the latter compared to T. H. Marshall’s triadic model of citizenship. The EU, 
furthermore, remains weak in terms of procedures empowering direct citizen 
participation since many of the opportunities for citizen participation in the EU are 
indirect, non-binding and informal. Finally, while the EU seems to be perceived as an 
independent polity in its own right by national governing elites, Eurobarometer surveys 
suggests that the vast majority of national citizens have a quite different perspective. 
Apart from a small minority of European enthusiasts, most citizens still identify 
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themselves as members of their various national polities. European citizens, therefore, 
do not share a strong ethical self-understanding in the sense of a communio. 
 
Although European citizenship remains dependent on national citizenship, it has 
triggered a shift from nationality to residence as a criterion for the acquisition of certain 
national citizenship rights. The incremental expansion of the rights of EU citizens based 
on the recent case law of the ECI has, therefore, partly undermined the linkage between 
rights, participation and belonging. As a result, European citizenship is bound to have 
an impact on national citizenship. It is, in particular, social rights that seem problematic 
in the European context. While civil and political rights can be redistributed without 
restriction because they are not scare resources, this is not the case with social rights: no 
citizen forfeits his or her rights by granting voting rights to others although it decreases 
the influence of each vote, the citizen “is, however, deprived of share of society’s 
resources when these resources are distributed to others in the form of public benefits” 
(Greven 2000: 43). This issue is exacerbated at the European level where the 
willingness of European citizens to support generous redistributive measures are limited 
because of the lack of a strong European collective self-understanding as well as the 
lack of opportunities to participate in deciding what those rights ought to be. 
 
Despite the introduction of the European Citizens’ Initiative, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the EU still suffers from a citizenship deficit. There is no doubt that the 
ECI is a significant innovation, however, its contribution to the facilitation of a 
European public sphere remains limited as long as European citizenship deviates 
significantly from the normative ideal. It is even questionable whether the ECI really 
contributes to European citizenship since it does not introduce an element of direct 
democracy but only provides European citizens with the right to place an issue on the 
agenda for legislative consideration. In this sense, the ECI can be seen as just a mere 
reinforcement of the existing right of European citizens to address a petition to the 
European Parliament now extended towards the Commission. Nonetheless, the ECI still 
has the potential to contribute to a more adequate model of European citizenship. This 
would be the case if the ECI would be linked to the referendum model, which would 
provide European citizens with an opportunity structure for direct participation. In its 
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present form, the ECI is, however, more likely to generate a segmented public sphere 
rather than a general European public sphere. Furthermore, while the intention of the 
ECI is to decrease the democratic deficit by reducing discrepancies between the 
empirical concept of European citizenship and normative theories of democratic 
legitimacy, it might have the opposite effect if European citizens come to expect that 
they will be able to influence European decision-making but it turns out that there is 
limited political will in the EU to actually satisfy such expectations. 
 
This paper does not argue that the nation-state is the most natural form of government 
or that nation-states are democratic but the EU is not. However, the paper is suggesting 
that due to the European citizenship deficit, European citizens currently exist only as 
citizens of their Member States. A demolition of the nation-state might, therefore, spell 
the end of European democracy. Furthermore, it is not desirable to try to democratise 
the EU as long as there is no evidence that European citizens want it. Thus, if Europe 
ought to remain democratic, its political form will need to be made with its citizens’ 
support and contributions rather than through political engineering. According to 
Bellamy et al. (2006: 26), it “is not European citizens who need to be made in the image 
of an already made Europe, it is a democratic Europe that needs to be constructed to 
reflect the (often conflicting) images of its citizens.” 
 
Before turning to a final discussion on the democratic deficit in the EU, it is necessary 
to pinpoint that there are some obvious limitations to the normative model of democracy 
proposed in this paper as well as the suggestion that the democratic deficit is a 
citizenship deficit. First of all, it is probably not necessary that it is the EU that provides 
European citizens with civil, political and social rights. It is possible to imagine a 
constellation where it is sufficient that the EU grants some political rights at the 
European level while it is the Member States that protects civil rights and provides 
social rights, although it means that European citizens do not have access to the same 
array of rights. Furthermore, in a large-scale, multi-level and complex polity such as the 
EU, it is difficult for citizens to rely solely on their own direct participation in the 
decision-making processes since this would require a substantial amount of resources to 
do so. Finally, given the sheer size of the EU and the diversity of cultures that it 
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encompasses, it is difficult to imagine the development of a shared ethical self-
understanding. While this is limitations to the research idea of this paper, it also 
highlights that it is questionable whether the EU can, in fact, become a democratic. 
 
It has often been suggested that it is possible to address the democratic deficit in the EU 
in two alternative ways: the first alternative is a transfer of the ability to act back to the 
nation-states; the second alternative is a transfer forward of sovereignty to European 
institutions. In the first alternative, the nation-states remain sovereign; however, this 
offers little real hope in the age of globalisation where the nation-state is too small to 
address the negative social and environmental effects of an increasingly globalised 
capitalism. Globalisation, therefore, undermines the nation-state as the locus of some 
political decisions. According to Grande (2000: 115), democracy can no longer be 
realised with the realm of the nation-state. It, therefore, appears that democracy can only 
be fully sustained by extending democracy to institutions beyond the nation-state. 
However, the second alternative requires the emergence of a general European public 
sphere, at least if it is assumed that the EU is to be a democratic polity; this in turn, 
presupposes the development of a truly European citizenship. 
 
As such, Europe is facing a unique moment of institutional innovation that attests to 
what Robert A. Dahl (1994) has called ‘the third transformation’ in the history of 
democracy (Eriksen & Fossum 2000: 2). The first phase concerned the transformation 
of the undemocratic city-states into democracies and began in the fifth century B.C. in 
Greece (Dahl 1994: 25); the second phase concerned the democratisation of the national 
state in the wake of the French and American revolutions (Eriksen & Fossum 2000: 2). 
There is a parallel between these two phases: as the city-state became too small to cope 
with its problems, the nation-state today is too small to cope with the challenges 
stemming from the increasing globalisation of markets (Eriksen & Fossum 2000: 2).  
The second transformation was made possible by a transformation of the idea of 
democracy from assembly democracy in the city-state to representative democracy in 
the nation-state (Dahl 1994: 25.) Similarly, many academics and policy-makers seek to 
abandon the nation-state as a model for the EU and see European citizenship as an 
opportunity to go beyond traditional normative theories of democracy (Bellamy 2008: 
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597). Nonetheless, as long as there is no general European public sphere in which 
European citizens can deliberate on a common future, “the danger is that the third 
transformation will not lead to an extension of the democratic idea beyond the nation-
state but to the victory in that domain of de facto guardianship” (Dahl 1994: 33). 
 
The failure to transform European citizenship into a more adequate model of citizenship 
with the formal dimension of rights and duties, on the one hand, and the substantive 
dimensions of participation and identity, on the other, may, therefore, endanger 
European democracy if the process of transferring powers from the nation-state to the 
EU continuous. As a result, European citizens are caught up in a democratic dilemma: 
they can either choose to remain citizens of their respective nation-states, although this 
means that their ability to influence the EU in a democratic fashion remains limited; or, 
they can choose to become truly European citizens even though this will bring about the 
end of European nation-states. From a democratic perspective, it is only the last option 
that potentially offers a solution to the democratic deficit in Europe. Until European 
citizens have made that choice, they must continue to be merely subjects of the 
European Union rather than citizens in a democratic polity. 
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